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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
AN EXAMINATION OF THE POSSIBLE CONSOLIDATION
OF AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL POWER
THROUGH SELECTIVE MIGRATION
by
Brian Dean Abramson
Florida International University, 2002
Miami, Florida
Professor Abraham D. Lavender, Major Professor
This study examined whether African Americans could consolidate political power
through a migration into a specific state or set of states in sufficient numbers to establish
a voting majority within that state. In order to examine the feasibility and efficacy of this
strategy, a variety of factors were reviewed, including the historical context leading to the
current situation; the political benefits to be derived from the control of a state; and the
population and migration patterns of African Americans.

The results indicated that this

strategy could succeed in providing significant substantive and symbolic political benefits
to the African American community, but could also have some negative repercussions.
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INTRODUCTION

Could African Americans enhance their political power through a movement
designed to accelerate the creation of a Black majority in a targeted state or group of
states?

Americans of African descent clearly suffer from a variety of disadvantages

compared to the White majority in this country, including a distinct deficiency of social,
economic, and political capital (Barker et al, 1999; Cancio et al, 1996; Feagin and Sikes,
1994; Hughes and Thomas, 1998).

In the political arena, Blacks are proportionally

under-represented in all branches and levels of government, including municipal bodies,
state legislatures, and the United States Congress (Bositas, 2000; Grofman et al, 1992;
Reeves, 1997).

In the entire history of this nation, only two Blacks have ever been

elected to the powerful position of United States Senator, and only one has ever been
elected as a state governor (Kiely, 2002).

This is not surprising, given the basic

ethnocentric tendency of individual voters, who feel more comfortable supporting
candidates of their own ethnicity. For Black communities in America, this tendency is
exacerbated by the fact that no state has been more than 36% Black since the passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 dismantled the mechanisms used in many states to deprive
Blacks of the ability to exercise their right to vote.
Research suggests that White voters in a given area become less likely to vote for
Black candidates as the Black proportion of the population in that area increases,
indicating that White voters experience a compelling sense of ethnic economic and
political threat (Grofman et al, 1992; Reeves, 1997; Taylor, 1998, 2000). Recent efforts
to enhance Black political representation at the national level have recognized the historic
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reluctance of White voters to vote for Black candidates, and have therefore concentrated
on creating majority-Black Congressional districts.

Such districts have successfully

allowed Black communities seeking both symbolic and substantive representation to
overcome the lack of support from White voters (Canon, 1999; Clayton, 2000; Grofman
et al, 1992; Reeves, 1997; Swain, 1995).

Despite the success of these efforts in

increasing political representation, they fall far short of providing representation at higher
levels of government. Furthermore, the maintenance of such districts requires a constant
struggle in the various state legislatures, which control the redistricting process, and in
the courts.

This process has proven to be expensive, time consuming, and ultimately

unstable, and furthermore is susceptible to manipulation by elements of the White

majority (Grofman et al, 1992; Hill, 1995; Reeves, 1997).
Moreover, some of the most powerful positions in American governmentparticularly U.S. Senate seats and state Governorships-are statewide offices, where no
redistricting effort will consistently yield the kind of Black representation that would
likely occur in a state with a majority-Black population.

This presents a significant

handicap to Black efforts to promote their concerns at the federal level, as the political
power of individual Senators vastly outweighs that of individual members of the House
of Representatives (Baker, 2001).

At the same time, low Black proportions in many

small states diminish the influence of Black voters in the elections of a significant
majority of Senators, further reducing substantive representation of Blacks in the Senate.
(Lee and Oppenheimer, 1999).
Blacks are able to exert only slightly greater political influence in presidential
elections. Black populations in certain large Northern and Midwestern states, such as
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Michigan, Missouri, and Ohio, are large enough that when White voters are split between
presidential candidates, Black voters can provide the swing vote that determines which
presidential candidate will receive the state's electoral votes. Because Blacks tend to be
affiliated with the Democratic Party, Black voters can have a significant influence on the
distribution of delegates for the party nomination in states where they comprise a
significant proportion of the Democratic party (Black and Black, 1992).

In this way,

Blacks may gain some substantive advantage by promoting first the nomination and then
the election of the candidate that will respond to their particular concerns. Nevertheless,
the uneven distribution of the Black population nationally combined with their consistent
minority status reduces their impact on the actual electoral vote relative to the White
majority (Black and Black, 1992; Frymer, 1999).

To date, the exercise of Black

influence within either political party has failed to secure the nomination of a Black
presidential candidate even when Black leaders have sought this nomination. The lack of
Black senators and governors also reduces the viability of possible Black candidates for
higher office, as these are the positions from which presidential candidates are most
frequently culled (Ardleigh, 2002; Kiely, 2002).

Barker et al. (1999) assert that race

remains one of the unspoken barriers to the presidency. Black electoral influence has
therefore ultimately entailed swinging the votes of certain states towards one of two
White candidates.
At the municipal level, Blacks have successfully captured the executive positions
in several large cities, but in those cities where Blacks are not the majority group, these
victories have been tenuous (Keiser, 2000b).

Even in majority-Black cities, efforts to

assert Black issues are hampered by the ability of the majority-White state governments
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to supersede the power of majority-Black city governments (Fleischmann, 2000; Lusane,
1994), even as White flight to suburbs outside of the city can reduce revenues and render
the city more reliant on the state and on commercial interests for funding (Rich, 1991).
The aforementioned imbalance in the distribution of power between large and small
states also significantly affects the direction of resources towards municipal concerns, as
this imbalance is skewed in favor of rural areas (Lee and Oppenheimer, 1999).
Given the problems inherent to Congressional redistricting efforts and the severe
lack of representation of Blacks in the most powerful offices of government, it would
seem that alternative approaches to addressing this situation are worthy of consideration.
In their broad history of the African American experience, From Plantation to Ghetto,
Meier and Rudwick (1976) discuss accounts of how the idea of engineering a majorityBlack state, either through a targeted migration or through alteration of existing state
boundaries, has surfaced in various permutations since the decades leading up to the Civil
War. Current trends in population growth already point towards the possible eventuality
of a majority-Black population developing in several states before the end of the twentyfirst century (Morganthau, 1997; U.S. Census, 2001).
This thesis will examine whether accelerating this process through various means,
but particularly through the migratory approach, is a viable strategy for greater political
empowerment; what the likely consequences would be for the political fortunes of Blacks
in America; and what effect the implementation of such a strategy might have on Black
relations with the White populations of that state, the region, and the nation.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

The political status of minority groups, particularly of African Americans, has
long attracted the interest of sociologists, and there is consequently a broad array of
literature on this subject. This includes investigations of the necessity of redistricting
efforts designed to increase Black representation in elected bodies at the municipal, state,
and federal levels.

The consequences of redistricting for the political process and the

subsequent quality of representation by Blacks, as well as by Whites with significant
Black constituencies, has been heavily researched. Grofman, Handley, and Niemi (1992)
present a detailed history of the social and legal circumstances that brought about the
creation of majority-Black Congressional districts, and conclude their examination with
an endorsement of such districts as a method of increasing Black political representation.
The argument for these districts is carried further with examinations of the negative
impact that the focus on race has on Black candidates engaged in political campaigns,
whether this factor is brought up by the media or by the White opponent of the minority
candidate (Reeves, 1997).
A significant body of work points to the success of redistricting efforts in securing
Black symbolic representation, and in increasing substantive representation through the
greater political discussion of issues that are important to Black communities (Canon,
1999; Clayton, 2000). However some assert that these redistricting efforts also aid the
Republican Party, which tends to oppose Black positions on these issues, by removing
Black support from White candidates in adjacent districts. This, they argue, leads to the
loss of liberal White representation, removing allies of Black causes (Swain, 1995) and
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reducing the representational power of African Americans by contributing to the

relegation of the Democratic Party to minority status (Hill, 1995). This analysis appears
to be affirmed when Black power in Congress is examined from the period after the 1992
elections, when Black candidates had realized their greatest electoral success in terms of
their numbers in Congress (Lusane, 1994), compared to significantly reduced Black
influence in this body after the Republican takeover following the 1994 elections

(Thurber and Davidson, 1995; Swain, 1995).
Some authors specifically examine the impact of the civil rights movement on
electoral politics (Andrews, 1997; Barker et al., 1999; Danigelis, 1977; Timpone, 1995),
while others review the political consequences of social movement participation
(Bearman and Kim, 1997; Whittier, 1997), and the structure of social movements in
general (Minkoff, 1997; Olson, 1971).

This leads to broader discussions of Black

political influence and strategies ranging from increased Black nationalism to integration
to assimilation (Abraham, 1991; Barker et al., 1999; Bobo et al., 2000; Thomas and
Wolman, 1972 [1970]).
Various models of municipal political participation of Blacks, and particularly the
effects on political relationships of approaching ethnic succession within a majorityWhite municipality, have been particularly well documented. It has been demonstrated,
for example, that Blacks fare better politically when majority-White cities elect council
members through district elections as opposed to at-large elections (Bridges and
Underwood, 2000; Bullock, 1984, 1992; Welch, 1990), but the most powerful offices in
city government-mayors and elected city managers-still tend to be elected at-large,
meaning that a Black majority is the only guarantor of continued electoral success in such
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positions. White responses to ethnic succession by minority groups at the municipal level
have covered a wide range of actions which have included: attempted annexation of
White communities into the city to maintain for as long as possible a White majority
(Barker et al., 1999; Fleischmann, 1991, 2000); anticipatory changes in the structure of
local government from at-large to district elections in order to preserve some White
political representation (Barker et al., 1999; Fleischmann, 1991); use of systems of
political patronage and "machine" politics to achieve similar ends (Barker et al., 1999;
Orr, 1997); transference of some powers of the city government to extra-municipal
bodies such as county or state governments (Barker et al., 1999; Fleischmann, 2000;
Vogel and Stowers, 1991; Warren, 1997); efforts to bring middle-class members of a
generally poor minority group into economic positions which would induce them to be
supportive of White business aims (Perry, 1997; Pierannunzi and Stone, 1997);
assumption of an active White minority role in city politics (Barker et al., 1999; Whelen
and Young, 1991); and wholesale abandonment of the city for suburbs (Rich, 1991).
Other sources of municipal research review the various kinds of treatment afforded
Blacks when they present a sizable minority of the community, where they may at
various times be included or excluded from governing coalitions (Barker et al., 1999;
Feagin and Parker, 1991; Glassberg, 1991; Keiser, 1997).
The diluted state of Black political power is exacerbated by disparities in the
power of political institutions, including the differences

between the House of

Representatives and the Senate (Baker, 2001), and the relative power in the Senate
accorded to states of varying sizes (Lee and Oppenheimer, 1999).

At the presidential

level, an examination of the voting patterns of Southern states, which have the highest
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Black proportions in their populations, reveals a similar dilution of the influence of
Blacks in electoral politics (Barker et al., 1999; Black and Black, 1992). The relationship
between Blacks and political parties is also examined, and researchers generally find
party politics to be lacking in utility for Blacks. This, it is popularly claimed, is the result
of overwhelming Black loyalty to the Democratic Party, which leads Democratic
candidates to feel that they need not actively advocate Black concerns in order to
maintain this loyalty, while Republicans feel that they can not win Black support anyway,
so they position themselves on the opposite side of the concerns of Black voters in order
to maximize White support (Aberbach and Walker, 1972[1970]; Barker et al, 1999;
Frymer, 1999; Lusane, 1994; Morris, 1992 [1975]).
Anthropological and historical accounts describe the circumstances of history
which initiated the Black African Diaspora, bringing the Black population to America to
be held under conditions of subjugation, even after this group was formally freed from

the institution of slavery (Edgar, 1998; Meier and Rudwick 1976; Segal, 1995). More
focused examinations specifically scrutinize the Black migrations of the Twentieth
century, providing anecdotal accounts of the Great Migration from South to North
(Adero, 1993) and the ongoing return migration from North to South (Stack, 1996; Cohn,
2001).

Another relevant area of examination is that of previous circumstances under

which a majority-Black state has existed, both under slavery (Edgar, 1998; Koger, 1995;

Wood, 1974), and during Reconstruction (Edgar, 1998; Gillette, 1979; Vincent, 1976).
Edgar's (1998) South Carolina:A History discusses these issues within the context of the
comprehensive history of that state, while Vincent's (1976) Black Legislators in
LouisianaDuring Reconstruction is specific to the period and locale described in the title.
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Definitions of race are also important in defining the dividing lines between the
populations under examination, and the development of these definitions has also been
examined in historical context (Davis, 1991; Lavender, 1999b; Wright, 1997 [1994]).
While some mention is made in historical context of various discussions of
establishing a Black state (Meier and Rudwick 1976; Segal, 1995), and even of using
population patterns and migration to consolidate political power (Barker et al, 1999), no
previous sociological examination has been done of the possibility of creating a majorityBlack state, or the political consequences of the existence of such a state, however it may
come about. This is the topic which I will address.

9

STRUCTURE AND FORM

This analysis will begin with an historic overview of the circumstances which
have brought about the current situation of under-representative Black political power. In
the course of this overview, it will discuss the development of the current remedies that
are being employed to rectify this situation, and it will then determine why these efforts
are insufficient to address the problem.

Building on the shortcomings of current

remedies, I will propose a new strategy for examination: the possible use of a directed
migration from one state or set of states to another state, with the intent of establishing a
Black majority in the "target" state, as a method by which this minority group could
I will then discuss how this strategy might best be

consolidate political power.
implemented,

and make

an

effort

to

determine

the

likely

consequences

of

implementation, success, and failure.
Before I set about discussing the specific proposal under examination, I must be
completely clear as to what is at issue and what is not at issue.

This thesis neither

advocates nor opposes the primary concept under review, which is the aforementioned
strategy of a minority group establishing a majority in a state. I will only examine the
feasibility of such a strategy and the likely consequences, using existing statistical data
and anecdotal evidence to evaluate several models depicting potential ways in which such
strategy might be approached.
The strategy being examined in this thesis does not suggest the creation of a state
or states where only one ethnic group is represented; rather it discusses the possible
establishment of a simple ethnic majority (essentially fifty percent plus one) of the
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eligible voters within a given state or set of states. Such a strategy would not necessitate
any kind of segregation, either legal or social, within any state; indeed, while it is
reasonable to anticipate that groups within such a state might tend to self-segregate, the
most optimistic outcome in a state so evenly divided between ethnic groups is that it
could prospectively serve as a model of integration and cooperation between these
groups. The strategy being examined does not suggest that the entire population of a
minority group should move to a single area, but merely examines the possibility of a
migration being undertaken by a sufficient number of persons from that minority group
(which may be a surprisingly small proportion even of the entire population of that
group) to establish a majority within a given state.
The strategy being examined does not suggest the creation of a separate nation or
'nation-state' or 'republic'

within the boundaries of the United States, nor does it

consider any alteration in the existing powers of state governments. The concept, rather,
is predicated entirely on the ability of a minority group to use the existing elements
common to the political structures of individual states to advance their particular
concerns in the same way that the White majority is already able to do in every state in
the country. This strategy does not require or even suggest that any existing boundaries
be redrawn, or that existing state or federal laws be changed; indeed, it requires the
stability of existing boundaries and many existing laws.
On a more individual level, the strategy being examined does not suggest that any
individual property be redistributed, or that land be 'set aside' for members of a particular
ethnic group, or that market forces and individual determination be overruled by
intervention from any element of government or any other organization.
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Instead, it

essentially examines the possibility of focusing migration which is already occurring,
through the same mechanisms that already determine where people will move and how
they will establish themselves in their destinations. Most importantly, this strategy does
not suggest that persons be coerced to move against their will or persuaded to migrate
under false pretenses; it only examines what the possible outcomes might be of people
choosing to act towards a specific collective political goal.
Because this paper deals with questions of ethnicity and refers to the relations
between specific ethnic communities, I feel that this is an opportune place to present a
few notes on the writing style. Much debate has centered on what terminology ought to
be used to refer to ethnic communities or to members of various ethnic groups,
particularly those of Black African descent.

Once-popular terms such as "Negro" and

"Colored" have fallen out of favor, and are even taken with offense by some, while
"African-American"

and "Black"

remain popular.

In

addition,

some "Black"

communities of West Indian descent maintain a cultural heritage and identity distinct
from Blacks with long-standing American roots.

"Black" and "White" are obvious

misnomers in describing the individuals to which these labels are ascribed, but they are
also succinct and universally understood.

Throughout this paper, persons of African

descent will generally be referred to as Black, or occasionally as African American, while
persons of European descent will be referred to as White. I choose to follow the example
of Clarence Lusane and capitalize these terms, because of the formality with which they
designate the groups under examination. In quoting the text of other authors, however, I
will, of course, preserve their style and terminology.
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CHAPTER I.
The Development of the Modern Dilemma

In order to understand why any strategy is necessary to advance the political
power of a particular minority group, it is necessary to first understand the circumstances
that have held back, and continue to hold back, the natural progress of this group in
relation to other minority groups and to the majority group. While the history of Black
oppression in the United States is a fairly familiar subject, some elements of this history
have a particular bearing on the modern-day questions of the distribution of political
power. The fact that Blacks require a unique solution to their disenfranchisement derives
from the unique circumstance of their oppression, beginning with the development of
economic slavery justified by the assertion of moral, cultural, and racial superiority on
the part of the oppressor.
Since the time of slavery, Blacks and Whites have struggled with the legacy of
White domination and Black oppression, as different factions within each group have
attempted to find solutions that accommodated their perceived interests. In many cases,
these solutions have involved the exploitation of the majoritarian control which is the
foundation

of the

democratic process.

Both geographic mobilization and the

manipulation of political boundaries have been used quite frequently as a means to
influence the existence of voting majorities for this purpose, most often to the benefit of
those in the White majority.
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Colonization and Slavery

The practice of slavery-persons being held as property by others-was common
throughout the world long before the voyages of Columbus spurred a European race to
colonize the newly 'discovered' lands of the Americas. However, the nature of slavery as
it was practiced in Europe and Africa was substantively different than that which was to
develop in these colonies.

Segal (1995) notes that as early as the year 1300 AD,

European records began to distinguish Black slaves from White slaves, but it was not
until the colonization of the Americas began in the 1500s that this distinction would
begin to carry legal significance. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the concept of
slavery shifted away from the ethnically neutral social status held by sentenced criminals,
children sold by their peasant families, and conquered subjects of enemy nations,
becoming instead an economic status determined by ethnicity.
Because of clear physical and cultural differences, Black Africans were already
widely thought of by White Europeans as 'inferior' and 'barbaric' people, not worthy of
the rights accorded to 'civilized' people.

As Segal (1995) explains, "white societies that

had prided themselves on their moral as well as their material progress excused the
exploitation of blacks, first by maintaining that blacks were naturally inferior to whites
and then, as this doctrine became increasingly unsustainable, by asserting the cultural
backwardness of Africa" (p. 5). This classification was the basis for the development of
the modem concept of slavery.

Slaves in previous eras could bear free children, for

example, and could expect the opportunity to earn money and buy their freedom, or be
freed upon their master's death; but slaves who were accorded that status because they

14

were thought to be inferior could rarely aspire to freedom by any means other than escape
and evasion, and their children were automatically accorded slave status, even if one
parent was free. Slaves in earlier systems could be educated, and some even served as
teachers, but slaves deemed inferior were generally discouraged from and often
prohibited access to education.

Slaves under earlier systems were more likely to be

household servants, living under the same roof as their master. Under the regime of
intense agricultural production in the colonies, the slaves were often geographically
separate from their 'owners,' and for this work, they "needed to be regarded not as people
at all but as pieces of machinery in a productive process, with their value based on the
money to be made out of them, minus the capital expended on their purchase and the
share of revenue devoted to their operational costs" (Segal, 1995, p. 17).
This same assertion was used by colonizing powers as a basis for early attempts
to enslave the native population of the Americas, who "proved to be increasingly
unhelpful," because they were prone to European diseases, were unable to withstand the
grueling routine of slave labor, and could easily escape to some safe haven because they
were frequently familiar with the area (Segal, 1995, p. 15). Throughout the colonization
period, White traders captured or (more frequently) purchased from various African
kingdoms millions of Blacks as slaves, most of whom were the prisoners of wars between
these kingdoms. These slaves were transported across the Atlantic ocean, under brutal
and harrowing circumstances, chained closely together in tightly packed ships, to
European colonies in the Western hemisphere.

Because the colonies throughout the

Americas were developed in tune with the slave trade, slavery became an integral part of
their economies. As Meier and Rudwick (1976) note, of all Black Africans brought to
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the New World, "less than 5 percent were imported into British North America" (p. 39),
the first twenty having been brought to Virginia as indentured servants in 1619 (Bennett,
Jr., 2000; Meier and Rudwick, 1976; Segal, 1995). By the middle of the 1600s, it had
become legally established that Whites in the British colonies could not be enslaved, but
that Blacks brought into these colonies could and would be slaves for life. Meier and
Rudwick (1976) note that "Negroes entering the colony thereafter lacked indentures, and
slavery would be limited to people of African ancestry" (p. 42).
Most Black slaves taken from Africa, however, ended up in Brazil, Cuba, and
Hispaniola, where they were more than likely to be literally worked to death. Meier and
Rudwick (1976) point out that in Brazilian and Caribbean colonies, "the death rate of
slaves was so high that during most of their history the slave populations did not
reproduce themselves and were sustained only by large imports from Africa" (p. 73).
From the beginning of the trade in African slaves, reports of this brutal treatment inspired
strong abolitionist sentiments among humanitarians in Europe.

Such sentiments were

later embraced by some American colonial leaders on the same moral grounds that
caused them to oppose the tyranny of the monarchical governments that had established
slavery in the first place, and were among the driving forces behind anti-totalitarian
revolutions throughout the colonies, including the American Revolution. The treatment
of slaves in the British colonies, however, was less hostile to the point that it was possible
for a large and regenerative population of native-born Black slaves to develop.

Meier

and Rudwick (1976) state that conditions were different in the United States, where "after
about 1720... natural increase rather than importations was the chief factor accounting
for the striking increase in the slave population" (p. 73). Indeed, because of the economic
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value of slaves and the high costs associated with their importation, reproduction was
encouraged, occasionally even leading to planned 'breeding.'
By the time of the American Revolution in 1776, slavery in what would soon
become the United States had become divided along geographic lines, as the South was
more environmentally suitable for the kinds of plantation crops for which slave labor was
most useful.

Increasing Southern support and Northern opposition to this practice

developed, highlighted by the fact that "beginning... in 1776, six of them banned the
importation of Africans" (Segal, 1995, p. 53), and most of the Northern states had ended
slavery in their territories by 1808.

Segal (1995) states that "in 1808, the federal

government banned new imports from the [slave] trade, while leaving the institution of
slavery itself to survive in such states as maintained it and to spread as it might only
south of the Ohio River" (p. 53).
The slave population had by this time grown large enough to be completely selfsupporting, and a new set of social circumstances arose to accommodate political reality.
Southern Whites were keenly aware that Northern opposition to slavery was continuing
to grow, and they feared that the more powerful North might eventually take steps to end
altogether this institution which Southerners had come to feel was the backbone of their
economy and, as a tradition, vital to their way of life. Occasional slave revolts had also
led White Southerners to become ever more fearful of their slaves, and of the possibility
of slave rebellions on a massive scale, resulting in strict controls over the activities of
their slaves, and of free Blacks in the South.

Systematic idiosyncrasies, such as the

fulfillment of indentured servitude from Blacks brought to America prior to the period of
slavery and the manumission of some slaves by their owners, had led to the development
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of a small but consistent population of free Blacks, but they were legally and socially
treated as inferiors and were generally denied any role in political processes throughout
the nation. Barker, Jones and Tate (1999) describe how "initially given the right to vote
in most states, free blacks were almost completely disenfranchised by the 1840s" (p. 14)
In some instances, the tension developing in the decades before the Civil War led to
attempts to re-enslave Blacks who had been free for decades. Koger (1995) describes, for
example, how free Blacks in South Carolina who could not prove their non-slave status
were aggressively sought and enslaved as the war drew near (p. 78).
The fact that Blacks were disenfranchised in the North, and were even barred
from holding offices in some abolitionist organizations, is indicative of the universality of
their lower social standing.

Meier and Rudwick (1976) note that even staunch

abolitionists such as Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln did not believe that Blacks
were truly the equals of Whites, and "thought it unlikely that Negroes and whites could
live peacefully with equal rights in the same country" (p. 159). Long before the actual
event of Emancipation, both friends and foes of the abolition movement pondered the
question of what should be done with masses of freed slaves, should anti-slavery efforts
succeed.

Even the most ardent supporters of ending slavery were not necessarily

prepared to accept these multitudes as equal participants in American society. The two
ideas that were most popularly discussed as means to deal with a newly freed Black
population were the repatriation of former slaves to Africa, and the colonization of new
lands, on this continent or abroad.
Barker, Jones and Tate (1999) state that the strategy of dealing with the Black
political presence though population transfer "received support from diverse quarters,
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including prominent whites such as Thomas Jefferson and President James Monroe.

These forces, led by the American Colonization Society, advocated emigration of blacks
to Africa" (p. 16).

Appleby (2000) describes how "Benjamin Lundy, the most ardent

Quaker foe of slavery, traveled widely in the west to find a location for a free black
colony, agitating for colonization in his Genius of Universal Emancipation" (p. 228),
while

Meier and Rudwick (1976) say that Thomas Jefferson "proposed that freed

Negroes be settled in their own society in the interior of the continent, far removed from
the whites" (p. 51), and that Abraham Lincoln "cherished the notion of settlement in
Colombia's Chiriqui Province (now in Panama)" (p. 159).
Free Blacks in the North, disillusioned with their own poor treatment and political
disenfranchisement, were not opposed to the idea of colonization as Meier and Rudwick
(1976) point out:
In 1854, 1856, and 1858, black colonizationists held their own national
conventions. They differed among themselves as to what would be the
best site. Some opted for the Caribbean area, especially for Haiti, whose
ruler encouraged their aspirations.
Several preferred Lower California
and the Far West of the United States. But the most popular place was
Africa. (p. 151).

Although there were some small settlements of American Blacks in Africa during
the first half of the 1800s, the vast majority of Blacks in the United States remained
enslaved in the South.

As long as slavery remained the backbone of the Southern

economy, the resettlement schemes envisioned by Jefferson, Lincoln, and other
colonizationists would exist only in the minds of those who advocated for emancipation.
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Emancipation, Reconstruction and Retreat

In the 1860s, Southern states reacted to the election of abolitionist Abraham
Lincoln and the implied threat of slave emancipation by declaring secession from the
United States. The North responded with military force, and ultimately fulfilled the fears
of the South, ending the regime of slavery during the Civil War. The Emancipation
Proclamation declared in 1863 that slaves held in the territories that had rebelled were
now free, and two years later the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution determined
that the rest of those enslaved would be free as well. Lincoln's ambition to colonize the
freed slaves in other parts of the hemisphere died with his assassination, and the Radical
Republicans who dominated the Congress thereafter were determined to keep the newly
freed slaves in the South, for several reasons. Chiefly they sought to balance the political
power of Southern Whites by establishing among former slaves the right to vote. Some
were also intent on punishing the South for the rebellion by forcing them to live among
their former slaves, while others preferred to encourage Blacks to stay in the South in fear
that they might choose to move to the North. Ex-slaves also came to prefer the idea of
remaining in the United States because the very act of their emancipation was sufficient
"to renew the Negroes' faith in the vision of a racially egalitarian and integrated
American society" (Meier and Rudwick, 1976, p. 152).
Some colonization efforts did continue after the war, but Gillette (1979) notes that
"mass deportation of blacks to Latin America or Africa was more extensively debated
than actually undertaken" because "emigration on so large a scale was too difficult and
too expensive" (p. 191-2).

He states that some leaders, both Black and White, had
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suggested the designation of "a new federal territory or state reserved as a black enclave"
but that ultimately, "most Negroes remained where they had always lived, and most
northerners were thankful that it was generally not in the North" (p. 192). Furthermore,

the aims of the Northern White Republicans in control of the federal government during
this period were best served not by colonization or relocation, but by empowering the
Southern Black population politically. As Gillette (1979) explains, "the Republican party
recognized Southern black suffrage as the only counterpoise to Democratic resurgence in
the South" (p. 7). Meier and Rudwick (1976) also note that a simple lack of foresight by
the politicians of the North was another important factor in the treatment of freed slaves.
Many had not anticipated that emancipation would actually occur, and therefore the
freedom of the enslaved led to much indecision as various ideas were cast about with
little firm resolution about how to provide for the former slaves and insure their rights.
Blacks throughout the South embraced the opportunity to participate in the
electoral process both as voters and by serving in various offices. As W.E.B. Du Bois
(1989 [1903]) noted, "the ballot, which before he [the Black American] had looked upon
as a visible sign of freedom, he now regarded as the chief means of gaining and
perfecting the liberty with which war had partially endowed him" (p. 5). However, Black
political power still existed at the pleasure of Whites who guarded their role in the
process, and the exercise of this power was thus under the control of their White
Republican allies. This was the case even in Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina,
where Blacks actually outnumbered Whites during the period of Reconstruction.

In

Louisiana, Blacks had only a slight majority, but Blacks outnumbered Whites by over
36% in Mississippi and by nearly 50% in South Carolina (Smallwood, 1998). Meier and
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Rudwick (1976) point out that despite Black majorities in the general populations and the
accusations of Black political domination made by Southern Whites, the highest positions
of power remained inaccessible to Blacks:
Actually, at no time can blacks be said to have been in control of any
Southern state. None was ever elected or nominated for governor. Only
in the lower house of the South Carolina legislature were black men ever

in the majority. South Carolina was the only state with a black serving as
a supreme-court justice, Mississippi the only one that sent Negroes to the
United States Senate. Obviously, even in these two states, where Negroes
were over half the population, they never really controlled the
governments since the highest state office eluded them and the majority of
important offices were always in white hands. (p. 187).

Despite the lack of true control in the hands of Black politicians, former slaveowners feared the possibility of Blacks using this power to exact revenge for their
treatment as slaves, and to force their acceptance into all areas of society.

Southern

Whites in general resented the presence of Blacks, whom they generally considered to be
inferior and incapable of exercising good judgment, holding positions of authority in their
governing institutions.

These Southern Whites therefore generated a mythology about

the corrupt nature of a government with Black participants. Vincent (1976) states that the
"classic picture of the Louisiana legislature, and other Reconstruction legislatures, depicts
a body controlled by evil whites and ignorant Negroes who combined to steal the state
blind" (p. 78) and that "a popular view of black legislators [during Reconstruction] is that
they held hostile feelings towards whites and wanted to punish them" (p. 222). White
South Carolinians, Edgar (1998) reports, were prone to "Denigrating and dismissing
black officeholders as illiterate, venal, propertyless rogues" (p. 388).
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Debunking the myth of vengeful Black officeholders, Vincent (1976) concludes
that "the contrary is closer to the truth. Blacks did not enact vindictive laws designed to
deny whites certain privileges" but in fact, Blacks "worked constantly to secure universal
education and improved educational facilities, including those for whites" (p. 222).
Vincent further highlights the fact that Blacks in general were more interested in equal
treatment than in actual social integration with Whites, claiming that the majority of
Blacks "were willing to forego enforcement of the integration clause in the [Louisiana]
constitution if schools were established in black communities" (p. 222). Edgar (1998)
states that when Blacks were "offered the rare opportunity to send their children to
integrated schools, most opted instead for all black ones" (p. 381). In South Carolina,
Edgar (1998) notes, emancipated Blacks quickly established all-Black townships "to
remove themselves and their families from any reminders of slavery" and as "a matter of
self-protection and a way to avoid violence" (p. 382). This strategy had some negative
repercussions, as the "withdrawal of blacks into their own communities, while giving
them freedom from white supervision, tended to increase white anxiety" (p. 382).
Emancipation and enfranchisement had proven to be a double-edged sword for
newly freed and politically enabled Blacks, for Southern Whites now saw their presence
as a political threat to be fought through a campaign of terror and fraud. Gillette (1979)
provides a counterpoint to the hopes expressed by DuBois, noting that "armed with the
ballot to make them more secure in their freedom, many blacks found that the privilege in
fact jeopardized their lives or their livelihood" (p. 37).

The North lacked the will to

enforce Negro suffrage, and as a consequence Gillette (1979) asserts, "political violence
flourished unabated, and electoral fraud was commonplace, sophisticated, and highly
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successful" (p. 43).

In fact, despite Northern opposition to slavery, many Northern

Whites disliked Negro enfranchisement as much as their Southern counterparts. Gillette
(1979) points out that "slavery was sectional, but racism was national" and that Negro
suffrage "was almost always opposed in northern state referendums and generally evaded
by northern Republicans" (p. 7).
While the Civil War had resulted in emancipation of enslaved Blacks, Southern
Whites had agitated for Northern withdrawal and against Black participation in the
governance of their states since the war had ended, and Meier and Rudwick (1976)
suggest that by the latter half of the 1870s, "the North had changed its mind" (p. 192)
about political empowerment to Blacks. They state that even those "who had been most
sincerely interested in the Negro became tired, disillusioned with the freedmen, and
enamored of the idea of sectional reconciliation" (p. 192). Vincent (1976) adds to this
analysis his contention that by 1877, "the national Republican party had abandoned
southern blacks" because Republicans "no longer needed their votes to sustain [their]
power" (p. 217). Thus the North ended its occupation of the defeated South after about a
decade and a half.
Once Blacks had lost the protection of Northern agents, their situation quickly
regressed into another cycle of repression almost as bad as slavery. Whites strove to
return Blacks to as close a condition to slavery as possible, which was accomplished
through political means, economic subordination, and violence.

Political avenues to

oppression included the establishment of 'Black Codes' and other 'Jim Crow' laws which
had been prohibited during the period of Reconstruction, which set limitations on the
legal rights of Blacks and relegated them to segregated facilities.
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As Grofman et al

(1992) note, without Northern interference, "the South showed no inclination to protect
the right of blacks to vote, and, in fact, began to institute a series of measures designed to
prevent blacks from casting ballots" (p. 6). These included laws that required individuals
to demonstrate literacy or property ownership, or pay fees beyond the means of Black
families in order to claim the right to vote, as well as devices such as "long residency
requirements and very short registration periods" (p. 7). Other techniques were used to
dilute the strength of the Black vote, including "racial gerrymandering, at-large election
systems, annexations or deannexations, or abolishing local elections for certain offices
altogether and making such positions appointive" (p. 8).
The economic element of this repression was embodied in the practice of
sharecropping, a system in which Blacks were allowed to farm a piece of land owned by
a White landlord in exchange for a certain amount of their production. However, the
system was set up to work heavily in favor of the owner, who would manipulate his
tenants into debt, forcing them to continue working long after the value of their work
exceeded the costs to the landowner of subletting his property.

This system was less

obvious than slavery, and easier to legitimate, as it could equally be applied to keep poor
whites in a similar state of perpetual debt. Blacks so encumbered essentially became
legally bound to the land, required to work for the landowner until the debt was repaid.
In addition to these nonviolent tactics, brutal violence was perpetrated by 'White
riders' in organized groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and similar bands, who terrorized
Blacks in order to keep them in line. These groups had come into existence shortly after
the end of the Civil War, and had been suppressed with limited success during
Reconstruction.

The withdrawal of the North allowed these groups to carry out their
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activities unhindered, which included the frequent lynching of Blacks who attempted to
assert their rights.
Many Blacks were willing to migrate towards better circumstances. Smallwood
(1998) reports that in the late 1870s, "Pap Singleton, a minister, sent out a call for all
blacks to go west to make a new start away from the racial persecution in the South" and
eventually lead over 60,000 Southern Blacks in "a massive exodus to Kansas" (p. 99).
Wilson and Ferris (1989) describe one of the first actual attempts by Blacks to use
migration to shed the burden of White domination and at the same time gain the benefits
of statehood, telling the story of how "Edward P. McCabe, who enjoyed a successful
career as a Kansas state politician, quit the town when the unassigned lands of Oklahoma
were opened for settlement in 1889." The authors explain that "McCabe envisioned the
creation of an all-black state when he established Langston, Okla., in 1890" (p. 198,
emphasis added). Meier and Rudwick (1976) also describe "the attempt to erect an allblack state in Oklahoma... initiated by E. P. McCabe, formerly state auditor of Kansas"
(p.248). They describe the scenario where, "disillusioned when the Republicans failed to
renominate him, McCabe urged blacks to migrate to the Oklahoma Territory when it was
opened for settlement. He painted a vision of a black-governed commonwealth, sending
representatives and senators to the United States Congress" (p. 248, emphasis added).

The relative success of the attempt was hindered by the conditions of the time, which
allowed Whites to prevent the culmination of McCabe's idea. As Meier and Rudwick
(1976) describe, from 1891 to 1910 "about twenty-five towns were established.

The

migration aroused fears in the whites and eventuated not in political power but in

disenfranchisement" (p. 248).
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McCabe's effort,

although noteworthy, was

unusual in its straightforward

intention of establishing Black political power through a mass migration. His effort
failed because of the willingness of Whites of that era to use both violence and political
maneuvers designed to disenfranchise Blacks, who lacked the resources and the allies
necessary to overcome such barriers. There were in fact, three more popular approaches
to the situation of Black disenfranchisement posited by Black leaders of the postReconstruction period.

Booker T. Washington advocated acquiescence

to social

subordination and development of economic self-reliance, admonishing Blacks against
migration because he simply did not feel that they could ever truly escape White racism
in that way.

W.E.B. DuBois championed a more confrontational approach which

emphasized education and political initiative. Marcus Garvey, who came to prominence
in the 1920s, endorsed Black nationalism and relocation, suggesting Blacks should
abandon the United States altogether and settle in a different part of the world.
While large numbers of Blacks did choose relocation to escape repression, they
were not seeking to escape the United States.

Instead, Southern Blacks moved to the

North in several large waves between 1910 and 1950 and Barker et al. (1999) state that in
Northern cities, "the migration of blacks from the South increased the black population
such that it became an important political force" (p. 18).

It is important to note once

again that there was no lack of racism in the North, and that much research has suggested
that ethnocentrism is often exacerbated by the presence of a large number of members of
a minority group (Taylor, 1998). However, states in the North had given up slavery long
before those in the South, and Northerners continued to be more liberal in their views
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regarding

relations

between

races, despite

friction between

urban

Whites and

immigrating Blacks.
The choice of internal migration also highlights the American identity of the
Black population. Appleby (2000) states that the decade of the 1920s "were a watershed
for free blacks who consciously moved away from an identity with Africa in order to
establish their claims to full citizenship in the United States" (pp. 228-9). This resurgent
sense of national identity prevented the Communist Party of the United States from
making significant inroads into the African American community, despite efforts in that
direction in the 1930s. These efforts included an addition to the party platform calling for
the establishment of an autonomous Black 'Republic' in the U.S. South, in the style of
the Republics of the Soviet Union (Meier and Rudwick, 1976). This enticement failed
precisely because Blacks saw themselves as Americans, entitled to their opportunity to
pursue the American dream despite the involuntary immigration of their ancestors. The
Black community which the Communists pursued "had no more desire to settle in a
separate nation than to go back to Africa" (Abraham, 1991, p. 205).
As Swain (1995) points out, Black political activity was profoundly transformed
by "urban migration, which made possible the concentration of large numbers of blacks
in congressional districts in cities such as Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, and New York"
(p. 36). There, large Black populations became sufficiently large and concentrated to
significantly influence congressional elections in their districts.
congressmen had come from the

All previous Black

South where their election was

enabled by

Reconstruction policies. The last of the post-Reconstruction Black congressmen, George
White of North Carolina, was able to remain in office until 1901. But it was from one of
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the great Northern cities-Chicago-that the Black presence in Congress was restored
after a twenty-eight year hiatus, with the 1929 election of another Black Republican,
Oscar DePriest. Once the Black migration had enabled Blacks to return to the Congress
representing districts in the North, Blacks would maintain that presence continuously and
use it to advocate their concerns at the federal level. Swain describes several significant
differences between Reconstruction-era Black members of Congress, and those elected

after 1928:
In the nineteenth century, blacks served short terms; in the twentieth
century, they have had continuous service and have risen in seniority. In
the nineteenth century, all black representatives were Republican; in the
twentieth century, almost all have been Democrats; In the Reconstruction
era, 92 percent of the blacks came from congressional districts with black

majorities; in the twentieth century, black candidates have no longer been
dependent on black majorities as their only means to reach Congress. (pp.
33-4)

The return of Blacks to the United States Congress was a factor in the resurgence
of Black efforts to obtain equal rights, as was the experience of Black soldiers returning
from the socially liberating atmosphere of military service in the Second World War.
Some moderate Southern White politicians of this era, particularly those in urban
settings, also saw the value of recruiting Black voters.

Fleischmann (1991) describes

how, in the 1940's, Atlanta mayoral candidate William B. Hartsfield "cemented a
coalition between blacks and middle-class whites that excluded poor whites, the
staunchest supporters of segregation. This was in marked contrast to other large cities in
the South, where white politicians seeking municipal offices tended either to unite white
voters in opposition to black-supported candidates or to build coalitions along class lines
rather than racial lines." (p. 101)
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Of equal significance was the change in the nature of the Supreme Court, which

had heretofore been complicit in upholding many of the Southern disenfranchisement
techniques.

In the decades after the retreat from reconstruction, the Court had upheld

segregation, literacy tests, poll taxes, and similar measures.

Grofman et al (1992)

describe a gradual change in the Court's attitude beginning in 1915, when "in Guinn v.
United States, the Supreme Court declared Oklahoma's 'grandfather clause' was
unconstitutional" (pp. 10-11).

In 1939, the Court ruled against an excessively brief

registration period in Lane v. Wilson (1939), and Barker et al (1999) trace the beginning
of the Civil Rights movement to the Supreme Court decision in Smith vs. Allwright
(1944), which eliminated the 'White primary' and thus opened the door for Blacks to
participate politically in the South. "Following the death of the white primary in 1944,"
they write, "black political activity increased significantly.

Assimilation/integration

became the dominant policy orientation among both black and white factions" (p. 19).
The White primary had removed Blacks from the process of nominating
candidates for office, and its defeat before the Supreme Court signaled that the Court
would be willing to intervene to dismantle the apparatus of disenfranchisement.

It is

important to note that the re-entry of Blacks into the political process in the South was
hardly guaranteed by these measures. However, efforts towards that end were certainly
re-invigorated.
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The Political Re-Awakening of African Americans

Before the next major upheaval in the segregated society of the deep South, the
conditions of segregation and disenfranchisement were so deeply imbedded that Lewis
Coser (1956) wrote that the "lack of conflict between Negroes and Whites in the South,
in contrast to frequent conflicts in race relations in many a Northern city has often been
taken to indicate that Negro-White relations are more stable in the South.

Such a

conclusion appears to be unjustified. The absence of conflict itself does not indicate the
absence of feelings of hostility and antagonism and hence absence of elements of strain
and malintegration" (p. 82). Only a year after Coser wrote those words, violent conflict
would arise again, and federal troops would be marching in the streets of Little Rock,
Arkansas, enforcing the first court order to integrate a public school (Bennett, Jr., 1992).
In the 1950s, Blacks began feeling empowered in sufficient numbers to conduct
protests, marches, and acts of civil disobedience on a large enough scale to disrupt the
social regimen of the South and attract national and even international attention. Buoyed
by legal victories, such as the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. The Board of
Education (1954) that segregated facilities were inherently unequal, and aided by
particularly sympathetic allies in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Martin
Luther King and other civil rights leaders encouraged White Northern opposition to
segregation laws. The Civil Rights movement of the 1960's, backed by the intervention
of the federal government, ended the repression embodied in Jim Crow laws, White
riders, and sharecropping.
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Ultimately, these efforts led to the passage,

and more critically to the

enforcement, of Federal statutes insuring the right to vote and equal access to economic

institutions and social institutions such as schools.

This enforcement was often

necessarily facilitated through the use of armed National Guard troops, and led to such
dramatic sights as Governor George Wallace of Alabama bodily blocking the doors to a
schoolhouse and declaring "segregation now, segregation forever!"

At the end of the

day, Governor Wallace did move-not only in allowing the schools to become integrated,
but eventually abandoning segregation as a political position in his (successful) future
campaigns.

The period was so dramatic in altering the status of Blacks and the

relationship between the races in the South that Blacks often refer to it as the 'Second
Reconstruction' (Robinson, 1998).
Three policies were established by Congress, endorsed by the courts, and
enforced with the full capability of the Federal government during this period as the
The first was institutional integration (or

primary tools in this fight for equality.

'desegregation'), which was imposed with the goal of breaking down the social barriers
which had long upheld the superior status of Whites and relegated Blacks to inferior
schools and poor locations on trains and buses. The second tool, affirmative action, was
developed to level the economic and educational playing fields, giving Blacks at least
some opportunity to make the gains needed to offset the denial of such opportunities in
past generations.

Finally, unwavering support for the principle of enfranchisement

insured that voting rights were carefully observed in order to bring about Black political
viability.

This effort was later fortified with legislation which prevented state

governments from using election systems or fashioning electoral districts designed to

32

deny Blacks effective representation, requiring instead that majority Black districts be
designed in some cases to insure the possibility of Black representation for Black voters.
Black political enfranchisement was embodied in the Voting Rights Act of 1965
(VRA), a piece of legislation which finally and decisively affirmed the right of Blacks to
vote unhindered. The act banned a variety of stumbling blocks to potential voters, such
as literacy tests and poll taxes, and gave the federal government broad power to insure
that eligible voters were able to register and cast their ballots unfettered by state action.
Grofman et al. (1992) note, however, that "even before the Voting Rights Act was
passed, it was apparent that voting was only the first hurdle to effective participation.
The resurgence of black electoral participation brought to light a second-order obstacle
that had remained obscure as long as blacks were completely excluded from the political
process.

Jurisdictions that wished to continue to discriminate against blacks simply

moved from denying them access to the ballot to more sophisticated schemes developed
to dilute the impact of their new voting strength" (pp. 23-24).

The 1960s also saw the resurgence of Black nationalist movements. Meier and
Rudwick (1976) describe the development of "such Marxist-oriented revolutionary
movements as the Black Panthers, founded in Oakland California, in 1966, and the
Republic of New Africa, founded in Detroit the following year. Both advocated forms of
territorial separatism. The Black Panthers... espoused black control of the central cities"
(p. 311), while Barker et al (1999) state that the "Republic of New Africa... vowed to
establish an independent black nation in the Southern Black Belt" (p. 19). These groups,
however, represented the extreme position of the civil rights movement.
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Mainstream participants in the civil rights movement were more generally
concerned with obtaining equal rights for Black Americans, and for gaining recognition

of their standing as contributors to the nation as a whole.

They were generally not,

however, engaged in a wholesale assimilationist effort, which would occupy the opposite
extreme of the spectrum of responses to discrimination from that of the Black nationalist
organizations. While Blacks had long since determined that their national identification
would be with the United States, Davis (1991) notes that during the 1950s and the 1960s,
"black leaders concluded that complete assimilation of blacks as a people into white
community life is neither possible nor desirable. The general black rejections of total
separatism in favor of the strategy of integration into the dominant educational,
economic, and political institutions has been designed to obtain greater equality of
opportunity, not total assimilation" (pp. 167-8).

Black urban politics in the South developed as it had in the North with the
growing concentration of Blacks in large Southern cities such as Atlanta, New Orleans,
and Birmingham. William Hartsfield's Atlanta coalition between Blacks and moderate
Whites, for example, succeeded once again in 1961, when Hartsfield's successor, Ivan
Allen, Jr., used it to defeat segregationist mayoral candidate Lester Maddox.

It was

becoming clear by this time that Blacks would soon comprise a majority of Atlanta
residents, and within a few years Whites began taking steps to insure that the methods
previously used to bar Black political participation could not or would not be used against
a White minority.

Fleischmann (1991) reports that the "most apparent changes in

Atlanta's governmental structure occurred with the 1973 charter, which manifests the
recognition by Atlanta's leaders that the city would have a permanent black majority. A
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Charter Commission appointed by the Georgia General Assembly drafted a document
replacing the at-large Board of Aldermen with a mixed system of 12 district and 6 atlarge members... district seats guaranteed Whites more representation than they would
have secured under an at-large system" (p. 100).
Around the same time, Fleischmann (1991) reports that "Atlanta's last white
mayor, Sam Massell, included in his 1973 reelection platform a call for annexation of a
North Side area that would have added 50,000 whites to the city" which was a tactic that
"Black leaders saw... as a way to maintain a white majority in the city" (p. 110). Stone
and Pierannunzi (1997) report another, more conciliatory approach taken by Atlanta's
White business leaders, who had their own economic interests to protect. "As it became
clear that the city would have a black electoral majority," they explain, "an effort was
made to bring the black middle class into the mainstream of the civic life of the Atlanta
business community" (p. 169).
Barker et al. (1995) describe similar efforts to first dilute and then co-opt Black
political power in Alabama beginning in the 1960s. Black efforts to consolidate their
political power in majority-Black cities and counties were obstructed by White political
machinations.

In the city of Selma during the 1960s, for example, "when black voter

registration became sufficient to challenge white dominance, elections were structured in
ways that prevented black voters from electing candidates of their choice" through the
creation of at-large election systems, gerrymandered districts, and excessively stringent
requirements applied against both Black voters and Black candidates (Barker et al., 1995,
p. 78).

The authors describe how Whites "used racially biased annexation and

incorporation schemes to prevent black empowerment.
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In some counties, heretofore

unincorporated areas were incorporated within racially gerrymandered boundaries to
ensure white majorities" (Barker et al., 1995, p. 79).
When it became inevitable that Black majorities would have the power to elect
Black officials in certain Alabama counties "whites adopted a new strategy. Rather than
nominate whites who were destined to lose, they decided to develop alliances with certain
blacks in order to try to defeat those black incumbents who had led the movement for
empowerment and whom whites thought were too radical" (Barker et al., 1995, p. 82).
While this may seem to be a negative development in terms of Blacks being able to
achieve substantive representation, it is important to note that the enactment of this
strategy by Whites does have two distinct benefits for the Black community. The first is
that it preserves Black symbolic representation, and essentially signifies the end of White
efforts to end such symbolic representation.

This second is that it requires Whites to

admit that Black office-holders are not inherently harmful to White power, allowing them
to focus on the question of which Black office-holder they would prefer. The harm to
Blacks seeking representation that is substantive as well as symbolic still exists, and in
fact can be seen more palpably in some instances where symbolic representation was
never denied.
In Chicago and Baltimore the rise of an independent and substantively effective
Black leadership was hampered by the existing machine politics, with which some Blacks
chose to associate. Orr (1997) examines Baltimore, another city that developed a Black
majority, and states that "the experience of blacks and machine politics in Baltimore
confirms earlier research showing that the tradition of patronage and machines can delay
black political empowerment. The Baltimore case shows that machines can hamper the
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development of strong, independent black political leadership and foster internal
divisions within the African-American community" (p. 213). Barker et al. (1995) reach a
similar conclusion about Chicago, a city where Blacks have long been a sizable minority,
noting that machine politics and the organizations that supported them "provided blacks
with decades of representation, but that representation was 'merely symbolic.'
political power in Chicago was illusory" (p. 88).

Black

Substantive representation, therefore,

can be withheld from Blacks either through the denial of any representation, or through
the provision of representation that is only symbolic.
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CHAPTER II.
Success and Failure in the Continuing Struggle

The passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) was a major victory in
Black efforts to obtain the political representation that many in the Black community feel
is necessary to improve the social and economic standing of Blacks in America. The end
of voter disenfranchisement by itself has hardly yielded political equality to Blacks, nor
has it brought these efforts to an end.

Legislation can not by itself change the

ethnocentric tendencies of voters, which can be devastating to the opportunities for
representation of a group that is consistently in the minority.
The recent focus of members of minority groups, including Blacks, seeking
representation has been on redistricting plans designed to secure minority representation
where this is possible. Mandated under the VRA and subsequent legislation, such plans
have succeeded in promoting the election of minority candidates through the creation of
majority-minority electoral districts.

However, some researchers suggests that this

strategy may have passed the point of diminishing returns, while others go so far as to
assert for various reasons that this strategy has actually done more harm than good.
Those who assert the harm of this strategy cite in particular the manipulation of these
districts by those opposed to effective substantive representation for Blacks, and the
isolation of Blacks elected from such districts from the White populations that would be
necessary to secure support for a Black candidate for a statewide office.
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Persistent Ethnocentrism in Election Behavior

A large body of research shows that Blacks seeking statewide office are generally
held back by the unwillingness of Whites to vote for Black candidates. Reeves (1997)
evaluates the effects of ethnocentrism at the ballot box throughout the nation, contending
that "black office-seekers who compete in majority-white settings in the main are unable
to attract consistent widespread support because race perniciously influences both the
tenor of their electoral campaigns and their outcomes. Nearly a generation after passage

of the most stringent federal voting rights legislation ever, we have yet to adequately and
fully address the question of ensuring equal political opportunity for black political

aspirants who compete in majority-white electoral settings" (p. 9; emphasis is author's
own). A number of different theories have been put forth to explain this phenomena,
attributing White ethnocentrism to various factors.
For example, Bullock (1984) suggests that ethnocentrism is simply a matter of
identification of a commonality, and is partly the result of campaigns which tend to leave
the voters ill-informed about the candidates from whom they must choose. He examines
the relative success of minority candidates against those in the majority, and concludes
that, "some voters turn to race as a cue if they find the competitors' policy stands equally
attractive.

Inability to distinguish the candidates' policy positions may result from

inattention by the voter, lack of specificity by the candidates, or a genuine similarity in
candidate stands. Candidates, knowing that many voters pay little heed to politics, seek
support by publicizing their background characteristics, which reveal little about their
competence or policy preferences" (pp. 239-40). He notes: "Race-but not religion or
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alma mater-is readily discernable by a glance at a campaign poster, brochure, or
television ad" (p. 240). His conclusion from that point is that a voters decision to cast his
or her ballot for a candidate of his or her own race "may be the result of reliance on a
simple, readily available cue, much as a candidate's last name prompts some ethnically
oriented voters to forsake party identification and support a fellow ethnic" (p. 240).
Reeves (1997), Taylor (1998), and Grofman et al. (1992) endorse the theory that
increasing proportions of a minority group promote a distinct sense of ethnic threat to the
power of the majority. He states that "the greater a district's racial composition tips in
blacks' favor, the more inclined whites are to project the racial fears and anxieties they
hold about blacks as a group onto an individual black office-seeker" (p. 101).

This

particularly true in those Southern states which have the highest Black proportions. As
Bullock (1984) notes, in some communities in the South, "prejudice among whites and
the desire for self-preservation by blacks produce almost total racial polarization at the
ballot box" (p. 250). Reeves (1997) asserts that "were it not for predominantly black
districts (which, parenthetically, are some of the most integrated election districts in the
country), fewer black lawmakers would have been sent to Congress. This is especially so

in the South" (pp. 95-96).
A rough examination of the effect of Black proportion on the willingness of
Whites to vote for a Black candidate for higher office can be derived by examining data
from the General Social Survey (GSS) which asks respondents, "If your party nominated
a (Negro/Black/African-American) for President, would you vote for him if he were
qualified for the job?"

This question has the great advantage of having been asked in

sixteen different administrations of the GSS over a twenty-four year period, from 1972 to
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1996, allowing for the analysis of the passage of time as a factor.

There are, admittedly,

several particular weaknesses presented by this question, which is the only question in the

GSS which directly addresses the willingness of respondents to vote for a Black
candidate for any office. For example, it is only asked regarding presidential candidates,
which does not address the dynamic of local politics. The question also asserts that the
Presidential candidate is the nominee of the respondent's own political party without
specifying within that context whether the candidate shares some of the views which
compel the respondent to affiliate with that party. The wide range of views expressed
within each party make it is possible for a person to receive the nomination who may
share very few positions with a given respondent. Another key problem is the possibility
of some respondents giving the 'socially desirable' answer, and not being truthful.
Although the number of respondents who indicated that they did not know whether they
would vote for a Black presidential candidate was relatively small, Reeves (1997)
provides plentiful anecdotal evidence to support his assertion that White voters who
declare themselves 'undecided' when polled in an electoral contest between Black and
White candidates eventually tend to vote in substantial proportion for the White
candidate.
The following tables examine the relationship between the willingness of Whites
to vote for a Black candidate for President nominated by their own party and a variety of
other factors also derived from responses to the GSS. Age is measured in whole years,
the youngest interviewees being 18 years old, with a range that trickles up to 89.
Education is also measured in whole years, ranging from 0 (indicating no formal
education) to 20 (indicating 20+ years of formal education). Political views are measured
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by the self identification of respondent's ideological orientation on a scale that ranges
from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative).

Because of the likelihood of

overlap between ideological orientation and party identification, I chose only to use the
former measure, which has the advantage of being an ordinal as opposed to a nominal
variable. Similarly, I chose to exclude income, as the indicators for higher income tend
to be captured in age and level of education.
Values for 'Black % of region' were calculated by marrying the GSS data for the
respondent's region of interview to the 1990 Census data for that region. Since only data
from the 1990 Census was incorporated into this calculation, the question arises as to
whether this is sufficient to gauge the influence of the Black proportion in a region for an
interview conducted in 1972, for example.

However, several sources indicate that

although there has been a significant trend towards urbanization of the Black community
from 1970 to the 1990's, there have been only minor changes in the regional racial
distribution of Americans, insufficient to upset the calculation (Kromkowski 2000;
Lusane 1994; Meier and Rudwick 1976).
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Table I.
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
GSS data for Age, Education, Political Views, and Year
N

Mean

S.D.

Age

18612

45.54

17.72

Education

18638

12.48

3.11

Political Views

15948

4.14

1.31

Median

Year

17753

1983

Source: General Social Survey

Table II.
Logistic Regression predicting willingness of Whites to vote
for a Black candidate for President nominated by their own party.
Model 1

Model 2

Coef

exp(b)

SE

Coef

exp(b)

SE

Constant

2.416a

11.197

0.052

-41.256a

0.000

6.829

% Black

-0.056a

0.945

0.004

-0.050a

0.951

0.004

Year
Age

0.022a
-0.015a

1.022
0.986

0.003
0.001

Education

0.143a

1.153

0.008

Political Views

-0.106a

0.900

0.019

Chi-square
Cox & Snell R2
Nagelkerke R 2
N

250.479a

724.663a

0.016
0.029

0.062
0.109

15202

15202

a. p<.01

Source: General Social Survey
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As the results of Model 1 of the logistic regression indicate, the regional Black
proportion does seem to have a small but statistically significant influence of -.056 on the
willingness of Whites to vote for a Black presidential candidate, and by inference
possibly for Black candidates for other high offices.

In Model 2, the effect is only

slightly reduced to -.050 when other factors are considered. However, both the level of
education and the political views of the respondent have a more significant effect than the
Black percentage of the region, in opposite directions. Each additional year of education
makes the respondent approximately 15.3% more likely to be willing to vote for a Black
candidate for President, while one notch along the ideological scale from liberal to
conservative reduces the odds of a respondent holding this view by about 10%.
The impact of Black regional proportion on the willingness of Whites to vote for a
Black presidential candidate was relatively small, in keeping with the findings described
by Taylor (1998) in her study of the same variable, which used GSS Primary Sampling
Units instead of Census regions, and was therefore much more precise in the potential for
measuring the effect of Black proportion on the community level as opposed to the
regional level. Nevertheless, there is a startling parallel between the results of the logistic
regression on the regional level, and Taylor's (1998) finding that "a 10-point rise in the
local percentage of blacks is predicted to increase opposition to race-targeting
[affirmative action measures, which were one of the key factors of her study] about as
much as 3.3 more years of education would decrease it," (pp. 520-2) echoes my own
finding that a 10-point increase in the regional percentage of Blacks is predicted to
decrease willingness of Whites to vote for a Black presidential candidate by roughly the
amount of increase in that willingness that would be seen with an additional 3.27 years of
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education. In the 1996 GSS survey, White acceptance of the possibility of supporting a
Black presidential candidate surpassed 90% for the first time, and the overall trends
indicates that as time passes and people tend to become more educated, there will be a
continued positive movement in this direction.

Reeves (1997) and Grofman et al. (1992) both fault the media to some degree for
the current inability of voters to overcome concerns about race. Grofman et al. (1992)
express particular concern for appeals to voters to consider race as a factor in their
evaluation of candidates.

The authors assert that racial appeals "are present in a

campaign if one candidate calls attention to the race of his or her opponent or opponent's
supporters or if the media covering a campaign disproportionately call attention to the
race of one candidate or of that candidate's supporters" (p. 107).

Reeves (1997)

examines the prevalence of such appeals, and comes to the following conclusion:
News media organizations... in their coverage of electoral competition
between black and white political candidates, invariably promulgate the
campaign in terms of racial-political conflict as it defines or impedes on
campaign strategy and themes.
Or journalists and editors, perhaps
believing that they are simply reporting interesting aspects of the
campaign and the candidates, make continual references to race, most
often in the form of adjectives to describe the black office-seeker vis-i-vis
his or her white opponent. Hence, given the norms and conventions of
news organizations - the rewarding of messages that are dramatic,
personal , concise, and visual and that take the form of narrative - race is
treated as highly salient in the coverage of black candidates' campaigns,
thereby making the task of attracting white electoral support... all the
more difficult. (p. 23)

Reeves (1997) also asserts that the "contemporary tendency of whites to
discriminate against black political candidates on account of race shows how little
underlying attitudes have changed despite the significant gains made possible by the
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Voting Rights Act. As we have seen, equal political opportunity cannot possibly exist
where the subtle fanning of racial appeals impels racially biased behavior inside the
confines of the voting booth" (pp. 93-94 emphasis is author's own).
Frymer (1999) suggests that while overt racism has diminished, opposition by the
majority group to issues that are of particular concern to minority communities is now
hidden in ideological tones.

He states: "Whereas in the 1800s, racist ideology often

transcended broader left-right political distinctions, since the 1960s the two have subtly
blended together" (p. 87).

Black and Black (1992) note: "Prejudicial feelings and

conflicts of interest between whites and blacks can still be exploited in elections,
especially when the appeal can be packaged in symbols or issues that have no explicit
connection with race" (p. 7).

Some Blacks have succeeded politically by carrying a

conservative message that seems to oppose conventional Black political thinking, Reeves
(1997) concedes: "Critics of race-conscious districting habitually point to the fact that
black Republicans Gary Franks of Connecticut and J.C. Watts of Oklahoma won election
from majority-white congressional jurisdictions in 1990 and 1994, respectively," but
asserts that these candidates have been able to succeed in districts where blacks account
for fewer than 6% of the population precisely because, "there is no sizable black
constituency to moderate the black candidate's stance on race" (pp. 100-101).
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Gains Earned and Lost in Recent Decades

Black political power over the past several decades has been vested primarily in
municipal officers and members of Congress, along with a variety of officials in nonelected positions, including some federal judges and Cabinet members. Majority-Black
cities and counties have consistently elected Black mayors and council members, and
through the control of those offices, Blacks have successfully sought the hiring of Black
city/county managers, police chiefs, school superintendents, and other non-elected
municipal officers. Some of the largest and most prominent cities in America-Atlanta,
Baltimore, New Orleans, Detroit, and Washington D.C.-have reached Black majorities
and come under Black control. Majority-Black congressional districts, as mandated by
the Department of Justice's interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, have given some
security to Black members of Congress from Southern states with high Black
proportions. At the same time, control over redistricting in Northern states by coalitions
of Blacks and sympathetic White allies has led to the creation of several secure Black
Congressional districts in the North.
Despite all of these gains, Blacks still lag far behind Whites in terms of
proportional representation within elected bodies at all levels of government.

The

following table demonstrates how Blacks are under-represented in elected offices in the
20 states with the highest proportions of Black residents. The figures are garnered from
the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, a private organization dedicated to
tracking Black political and economic representation.
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Table III.

Representation of Black Elected Officials compared

With Black proportion of state population for the
top 20 states with the highest Black proportions.

STATE

%
Blacka

U.S.
Reps

State
Senators

State
Reps.

All
offices

Mississippi

36.620

25%

19%

29%

19%

Louisiana
South Carolina

32.856
29.933

14%
17%

23%
15%

21%
21%

14%
14%

Georgia

29.236

23%

20%

18%

9%

Maryland
Alabama
North Carolina
Virginia
Delaware
New York
Tennessee
Arkansas
Illinois
Florida

28.793
26.287
22.068
20.360
20.055
17.043
16.757
15.978
15.602
15.465

25%
14%
15%
9%
0%
14%
13%
0%
16%
12%

19%
23%
14%
13%
5%
10%
9%
9%
14%
13%

21%
26%
14%
10%
7%
14%
13%
12%
13%
13%

8%
17%
9%
8%
2%
1%
3%
6%
1%
4%

Michigan

14.837

13%

13%

14%

2%

New Jersey

14.401

8%

10%

14%

3%

Ohio

12.089

6%

12%

13%

2%

Texas
Missouri
Pennsylvania

11.956
11.713
10.497

6%
13%
5%

6%
12%
6%

9%
8%
7%

2%
1%
1%

a. source: U.S. Census
b. includes all elected federal, state, county, and municipal offices at all levels within the
state; depending on local practices, this may also include elected judges and school
district officials
Source: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies
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The preceding figures demonstrate that Blacks are particularly under-represented
when all elected offices are taken into account. However, Bositas (2000), writing for the
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, notes that there has been continuing
improvement during the decades that the number of Black elected officials been tracked.
Clayton (2000) argues that such improvement is the result of the success of race-based
redistricting.

He notes that "creation of majority-minority districts has helped increase

the representation of African Americans

at the congressional

level.

The CBC

[Congressional Black Caucus], although representing a more diverse constituency than
ever, still serves to protect the interests of black Americans. With the increase of CBC
members to 38, it has established itself as a formidable caucus now able to form
coalitions with other informal groups in Congress. The CBC can help pass legislation
critical to the black community: housing, education, unemployment, and crime" (p.22).
Swain (1995)

concurs with Clayton's assessment that redistricting has promoted

substantive representation, noting that where "blacks have become more experienced in
Congress, they have become more effective.

Their ability to provide substantive

representation for their constituents has increased with their understanding of the
procedural rules of Congress: the amendment process, bill drafting, timing, and
logrolling. Representatives who know the institutional rules of Congress have power far
beyond their individual vote" (p. 44).
Clayton (2000) argues for a continuation of the existing strategy of creating and
maintaining majority-Black congressional districts, stating that "the case for majority
black congressional districts remains compelling" because of "continued residential
segregation, the existence of racial-bloc voting on the part of whites, and lack of minority
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success absent race-conscious remedies," (p. 4).

Racially-conscious congressional

redistricting efforts may have already approached the limits of increasing Black
representation in Congress, however. As Swain (1995) concludes, "Black politicians are
already representing all of the country's majority-black congressional districts, and after

the 1992 elections relatively few areas remain where blacks are sufficiently concentrated
for courts and state legislatures to create new districts." She concludes that in the future,
"significant growth in the number of blacks in Congress cannot come from creating
newly [majority-]black districts" (p. 207).
Municipal gains have also been consolidated, in some cases with great success.
Stone and Pierannunzi (1997) describe how the sharing of power "in Atlanta's regime
rests on the fact that African Americans have numbers and substantial voting power but
limited economic resources.

The business elite controls enormous economic resources

but lacks numbers. That African Americans could supply needed numbers paved their
way into incorporation initially, and as those numbers reached an electoral majority, they
took on added weight" (p. 166). However, while businesses operating in Atlanta count
on Black political support to some degree, "the white business elite has... made use of
varied strategies to see that major parts of economic development activity would be
insulated from city hall control.

Therefore, while African Americans have achieved a

strong form of electoral incorporation, their control is over a limited sphere of
development-even though much of that activity is publicly subsidized" (p. 169).
Stone and Pierannunzi (1997) discuss the irony of Black leaders in Atlanta, who
had once opposed the annexation of White suburbs for fear of losing political clout, now
considering the annexation of such areas to improve the city's economic standing. "The
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tables had turned by the 1980s," they declare, "when several black leaders actively
discussed annexation of Sandy Springs, an affluent white area just north of the city,
whose acquisition would add a substantial tax base but not threaten Atlanta's status as a
black-majority city" (p. 110). Examining the degree to which majority-Black status has
increased

Black control over their economic

destiny, they conclude

that "the

incorporation of African Americans into the Atlanta regime amounts to more than
electoral control of city hall. It extends into the business and civic life of the city, but this
incorporation is limited.

Business interests make key decisions in the privacy of the

boardroom, not in the more racially inclusive circles of Atlanta's civic life" (p. 171).
Lusane (1994) discusses how in the 1970s, "Black mayors of big cities, by virtue
of their high visibility and powerful positions, assumed national stature." He affirms,
however, that the power of Black mayors is often limited by the structures and powers of
their counties and states, stating that "more than half are located in small, majority Black
towns of less than 2,000 residents-towns that are dependent on White-controlled county
and state government bodies" (p. 23).

Municipal Black majorities, therefore, may

guarantee Blacks the opportunity to elect officials that represent their experience, but this
does not necessarily guarantee that this political power will facilitate swift social or
economic change.

Whelan and Young (1991) note that even after New Orleans had

become a majority-Black city, and had elected a Black mayor, that mayor had to take a
nonelected governing board to court in order to secure positions for Black members (p.
139), and Perry (1997) reports that "blacks in Birmingham have clearly not achieved an
equitable proportion of municipal employment commensurate with their approximately
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55 percent of the city's population," although he does allow that "they have made
significant progress in increasing their representation in municipal employment" (p. 189).
Despite the gains that have been won, and the fact that segregation is no longer
discussed as an option, there have been significant setbacks.

Black mayors have also

been elected in large cities without Black majorities, but these elections have not created
opportunities for consistent Black representation.

Browning et al (2000) note in

discussing the loss of Black-held mayorships in Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles and
New York, for the people "who welcomed the growing political incorporation of African
Americans as a solution to their unacceptable exclusion, these defeats have been
sobering, to say the least. The defeats are real and the potential for further losses is not
insignificant" (p. 134). Large Black populations in these cities guarantee that there issues
will not be long ignored by any governing coalition, especially in cities where the Black
population is expected to represent a continually increasing proportion of the whole.
Glassberg (1991) says of St. Louis, for example, that "there is no reason to anticipate the
development of a black voting majority anytime soon, but expectations that the city
eventually will have such a majority play a major part in its politics" (pp. 86-7).
As in the post-Reconstruction period, many liberal Northern Whites have largely
withdrawn from an active role in promoting Black equality.

Indeed, opposition has

developed among Northern Whites to policies such as affirmative action, characterized
by White opponents as giving opportunities to Blacks by taking them from Whites.
Feagin and Sikes (1994) declare: "government action to eradicate prejudice and
discrimination has oscillated in recent decades.

From the early 1980s into the 1990s

African Americans experienced a conservative backlash against an aggressive expansion
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of civil rights and economic opportunities" (p. 322). At the same time, recent Supreme
Court decisions have overturned the previous trend of decisions supporting the creation
of electoral districts favorable to Black candidates. One Black scholar notes that "in a
reversal of political momentum similar in some ways to that of the late part of last
century, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist began to pull the teeth
out of laws designed to achieve racial equality" (Robinson, 1998).

Feagin and Sikes

(1994) claim that "major [U.S. Supreme Court] decisions in the mid- to late-1980s made
it much harder for blacks to sue for redress for racial discrimination" (p. 323).
Clayton (2000) examines the position of the Court on enforcing Black
opportunities for political participation and concludes the following:
Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered decisions that
were designed to provide a legal basis for blacks and other minorities to
challenge tactics diluting minority voting strength. These decisions,
coupled with a U.S. Justice Department's interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and its subsequent amendments requiring the drawing

of majority black districts by states where possible, created an
environment in which blacks were not to be relegated to a permanent
minority voting status. Today, much of that progress, along with majorityminority congressional districts, is being dismantled. (p. 130).

Many authors express similar pessimism in examining the prospects for Black
social and political advancement of Black Americans. Lusane (1994) states that Blacks
are not at all surprised to find that "racism continues to play a decisive role in the destiny
and life chances of people of color in the United States" (p. 3), and Frymer (1999) echoes
this concern, stating that even at the "end of the twentieth century, it is clear that racism
and racial inequality will not disappear any time soon" (p. 206).
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Lusane (1994) expresses the belief that "the strategy of voter registration and
voter turnout will likely remain predominant for the foreseeable future" (p. 35). Berry
and Blassingame (1992), however, suggest that Blacks require a more active strategy to
maintain their gains. Assessing the White withdrawal from active support for measures
that improve the standing of the Black community, they write: "As blacks reflected on
the strategies they might use to address political changes, they saw increasingly that
direct action, protest, whether violent or nonviolent, was an essential ingredient of
successful political action.

But the political action did not improve the overall black

condition. Even the new coalition-building politics had worked in the economic arena
only to the extent that the goals did not require inordinate sacrifices on the part of any
other members of the coalition" (p. 634).
While many of the methods of denying Blacks the right to vote and the right to be
represented have been challenged and defeated under the authority of the Voting Rights
Act, one key area in which Whites have been able to usurp the power of office thus
acquired has been to change the powers of the offices themselves. Barker et al. note that
in some Alabama counties, "many newly elected black officials in racially hostile
jurisdictions previously controlled by whites have found themselves denied funds,
equipment, information, or specific powers through new rule changes" (p. 83).

Such

actions have been determined by the Supreme Court to fall outside of the jurisdiction of
the Voting Rights Act. Although they deprive Blacks of substantive representation, the
Court has found that they are not directly related to the ability of Black voters to elect
candidates of their choice.
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The Inadequacy of Congressional Redistricting

There are many problems with redistricting, both for local and federal offices, as a
solution to the lack of Black representation.

These problems hinder the usefulness of

redistricting as a strategy for Black empowerment. Foremost among them is the disparity
in the relative political power of such offices compared to that enjoyed by those elected
to statewide offices, the attainment of which can not be aided through any redistricting
process. The short history of the redistricting process has proven that Black communities
seeking Congressional representation commensurate with their proportion within a state
may be forced to expend significant resources on lengthy court battles to achieve
satisfaction.

In the case of North Carolina in the 1990s, for example, litigation over

Congressional redistricting initiated in 1991 stretched into the middle of 1993 (Canon,
2000).

Louisiana "had three sets of congressional district lines based on the 1990

Census" (Barone et al., 2002, p. 667), the final version having been drafted by a federal
court in January of 1996, and then approved by the Supreme Court in June of that year.
Congressional redistricting designed to empower the Black minority in states with
large Black populations has proven to be susceptible to manipulation by elements of the

White majority. Canon (2000), Hill (1995), and Swain (1995) describe how Republicans
have sought to use this process to remove highly Democratic Black voters from districts
where they have traditionally helped White Democrats succeed electorally. Hill (1995)
notes that, after the creation of majority-Black districts in Southern states, "majority
white districts in the South now have an average proportion of 11.3% black voters, with a
7.5% standard deviation, down from 1990's 16.3% average with a 10% standard
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deviation. Thus, not only are the majority white districts less black, they are also more
uniformly less black" (p. 386). He arrives at the determination that "the Republicans
made significant gains in the South in 1992, many of which were attributable to the
creation of majority black districts" (p. 391-2). These Republican gains are no accident
of circumstance, as Hill (1995) concludes that an examination of these circumstances
bolsters the suspicions of "those claiming that the Republican Justice Department was
intentionally packing blacks into districts at as high a rate as possible" (p. 400) in order to
maximize Republican gains among the remaining districts.
Swain (1995) also criticizes the facility with which majority-minority districts can
be manipulated for the benefit of the majority group, and she discusses the specific means
by which this is done. She explains: "Racial gerrymandering occurs when district lines
are drawn to enhance or reduce representation of particular racial groups. Its major forms
are known as 'cracking' (a significant minority population is dispersed across several
districts to dilute its voting strength), 'stacking' (large concentrations of minority voters
are combined with white populations to create districts with white majorities), and
'packing'

(minority voters are put in districts that already have high minority

populations)" (p. 197). Grofman et al. (1992) note that "as a matter of practical reality,
the minority district(s) that will be drawn are districts centered in the heavily minority
areas of the jurisdiction" (p. 104), and Baker (2001) concludes that "creation of majorityminority districts... has also been criticized by scholars who point out, for example, that
few new African-American members will be produced by the practice of packing as
many black voters as possible into a district.
reached" (p. 111).
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The limit of such districts has been

Swain (1995) also explains that "Black politicians consider packing less harmful
than the other two forms of racial gerrymandering, because it adds to the safeness of their
districts... Only a minority of black politicians oppose the packing of black votes" (p.
198). However, she makes the point that even some Black politicians are wary of the
hazards inherent to this strategy, noting that "Representative Craig Washington, a Texas
Democrat... argues that isolating black voters in overwhelmingly black districts places
them in a situation where their policy preferences can be more easily ignored" (p. 198).
Baker suggests that this isolation of Black politicians in majority-minority districts can
further diminish their opportunities to attain higher office.

He states that avenues of

advancement to statewide office for black House members [are] impeded because those
from majority-minority districts will have had little exposure to white voters whose votes
they would need to win, for example, a seat in the U.S. Senate" (p. 111).
Perhaps the greatest failing in the strategy of redistricting is the innate instability
of the process. In accordance with Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution,
congressional redistricting is undertaken after every decennial Census. The process is
controlled by the individual states, generally by the legislature of each state (although a
few states have established non-partisan committees to conduct this responsibility). State
legislatures are themselves unstable bodies subject to the whims of the voters in their
composition and containing individuals with complex and changeable motivations. Most
importantly to the interests of Blacks, all state legislatures have White majorities, limiting
Blacks power to influence redistricting decisions. Hence, every ten years, a group of
mostly-White legislators seek to redraw the congressional districts of that state to suit
whatever the interests of the majority party in that legislature appear to be at that time.
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Relative Political Power in Elected Offices

How important is the lack of representation of Blacks among Governors and
Senators? Of over 9,000 Blacks holding elected office as of 2001 (Joint Center, 2001),
none is in either the United States Senate or a Governor's seat.

The numbers of

Representatives are below the general proportion of Blacks in America, and since all but
one are Democrats, the shift to the Republican control of Congress in 1994 has
undermined the power of Black Representatives within that body. Grofman et al. (1992)
note that as of 1990, "approximately 5.4 percent of state legislators and 1.5 percent of all
elected officials were black, compared with 11.1 percent of the voting age population" (p.
138). The most striking area in which Blacks lack representation is in the United States
Senate and in governorships.
There are currently no Black senators or governors, and in fact, Kiely (2002)
points out that out of "1,864 people who have served in the Senate since 1789, 15 have
been minorities: four blacks (two elected), three Hispanics, four Asian-Americans, three
Native Americans and one Native Hawaiian. More than 2,200 people have served as
governors. Nine have been minorities: four Hispanics, three Asian-Americans, one black
and one Native Hawaiian" (emphasis added).

These figures, of course, must be

understood in the context of several important facts.

The first is that Blacks were

essentially barred from holding any elected office prior to the Civil War. The second is
that for most of this nation's history, members of the U.S. Senate were appointed by the
legislatures of the states from which they hailed, and were not popularly elected until
1913, pursuant to the

17 th

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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Nevertheless, the lack of Black representation in these offices even since the
passage of the

17 th

Amendment is more than a symbolic slight. Baker (2001) and Lee

and Oppenheimer (1999) demonstrate how the nature and structure of the Senate as
compared with the House of Representatives make the former body vitally important to
the direction of national policy.

It can therefore be demonstrated that the lack of

consistent Black representation in the United States Senate handicaps the substantive
political power of African Americans. The significant difference in the level of power
exercised by a member of the House as compared to a member of the Senate is based
both on elements inherent to these institutions-particularly the size, the distribution of
seats, and the length of the term of office-and on the development of the rules under
which each body has chosen to operate.
Of the powers specifically reserved to the Senate, probably the most important to
the Black community is the Senate's ability to confirm or deny the appointment of federal
judges, including the Justices of the United States Supreme Court. Barker et al. (1995)
note that Blacks are currently under-represented on all levels of the federal judiciary,
including District Courts and the U.S. Court of Appeals (pp. 118-20). They assert that
"the fact that there are still so few black judges is yet another example of the
disproportionate representation and influence of blacks in the American political system"
(p. 120).

Lusane (1994) argues the importance of this circumstance to the Black

community, stating that "Supreme Court nominations have immense relevance to African
Americans. Critical Supreme Court decisions in the last century, most notably the Dred
Scott decision (1857) and Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), determined the destiny of millions
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of African Americans and codified into law and policy the mass repression and neo-

enslavement of blacks" (p. 75).
With only 100 members compared to the 435 in the House, an individual Senator
has 4.35 times as much voting power within his or her legislative body as an individual
member of the House. Even if the disparities ended there, the election of a single Senator
would still carry more weight in the Capitol as the election of four Representatives. Lee
and Oppenheimer (1999) note that the Senate as an individual body of government "is
coequal with the House of Representatives in all powers of legislation, even possessing
some powers not granted to the House, the most important being the right to approve
presidential appointments and treaties" (p. 2). Institutional rules give Senators additional
leverage within the Senate above and beyond the difference in power accorded by their
numbers. Baker (2001) notes that "rules of procedure that are promoted by the Senate's
smallness magnify the influence of the individual by allowing a single senator to
intervene - often decisively - in the legislative process.

Power of this magnitude is

accorded to only a handful of the top leaders in the House" (p. 73). He quotes former
Senator and former House member John Culver: "The rules of the Senate are congenial to
permitting the least consequential member to shut it down if he's smart enough or willful
enough to do it. If you're one in a hundred, it really doesn't matter a lot how long you've
been there. That gives any individual power - real power - in institutional terms" (p. 72).
Another area where the Senate gives its members increased power relative to the
House is in the process of attaching amendments to bills. Baker (2001) explains that
"House rules require that amendments to a bill made on the floor must be germane, that
is, relevant and pertinent to the bill itself. With certain exceptions, senators can introduce
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floor amendments that have nothing at all to do with the bill as it comes to the floor from
a committee" (p. 76). This is significant because it gives members of the Senate the
ability to force fellow Senators to take specific positions on issues. As Baker (2001)
notes: "Because they are able to introduce amendments on the floor virtually at will, any
senator can demand a recorded vote of his colleagues at almost any time" (p. 78).
Senators, however, generally do have more room to take unpopular stances on specific
issues, because most represent much larger constituencies than Representatives.

Baker

(2001) says that "House members, who lack any statewide constituencies, often represent
fewer interests and any given interest is likely to loom more imposingly in a House
member's calculations than that of a single interest in a large, complex state" (p. 50).
Procedurally, Baker (2001) notes that the Senate "is a shrine to the rights of the
political minority and its rules confer considerable power on it to thwart the will of the
majority" (p.

102).

Lee and Oppenheimer (1999),

however, discuss how the

apportionment of the Senate actually harms the representation of ethnic minorities. They
note, first and foremost, that Senate apportionment causes small states to be vastly overrepresented, noting:
Wyoming, with fewer than half a million residents, enjoys the same level
of representation as California, with more than 30 million. More than a
quarter of the United States population now lives in three very large,
rapidly growing states (California, Texas, and Florida), yet they are
represented by only six senators. A mere 7 percent of the total United
States population, on the other hand, resides in the seventeen least
populous states and is thus represented by thirty-four senators. (p. 2).

Because of this disparity, Lee and Oppenheimer (1997) argue that "Senate
apportionment works contrary to the purpose of protecting minorities. ... race has become
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so important in American politics that today the term 'minority' is almost synonymous
with racial and ethnic minorities.
additional

representational

weight,

Instead of ensuring that these minorities receive
Senate

apportionment

has

the

effect

(albeit

unintentional) of diluting their influence" (pp. 20-21). This outcome, they argue, occurs
"because the states with smaller populations also tend to be less ethnically and racially
diverse than the nation as a whole" (p. 21). Lee and Oppenheimer (1999) state that in
"the thirty-one over-represented states, blacks on average account for only 7.5 percent of
the population; by contrast, in the fourteen underrepresented states blacks average 14.3
percent" (p. 22). They further elucidate their argument by contrasting the proportion of
African Americans throughout the nation with the proportion found in the median state,
concluding that "the median state is in every case less racially diverse than the nation as a
whole.

For instance, although blacks account for 12.5 percent of the nation's total

population, the median state has a population that is only 7.1 percent black" (p. 22).
The political power of Blacks in influencing the election of Senators is further
reduced by the particular politics of many of the states in which Blacks tend to reside in
large numbers. In Southern states, which generally have the highest Black proportions,
White majorities present a sufficiently solid block of votes to override the strength of the
Black vote and elect more conservative candidates. Therefore, the concern of members
elected to the Senate is not in representing the interests of the Black minority, but in
maintaining the solid base of support from the White majority. In Northern states with
relatively high Black proportions, the more liberal tendencies of White voters in these
states tend to make the Black vote superfluous in the election of liberal candidates.
Blacks are important swing voters crucial to the victory of a candidate in only a handful
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of states, such as Michigan, Illinois, Ohio and Missouri, and even in these states they are
not always successful in determining the outcome of an election.
Stone and Pierannunzi (1997) underline the importance of majority-Black
governance

in achieving desired policy aims.

In Atlanta, they note, electoral

"mobilization was a key element in black incorporation, and incorporation as a voting
majority was central to the ability of the black community to achieve significant policy
responsiveness.

Clearly elections matter, and majority voting pays real dividends in

governmental decisions" (p. 165). Barker et al. (1999) agree with this sentiment, noting
that in Alabama the "election of black legislators represented a significant increase in
black political empowerment" (pp. 81-82).

Given the superior political power of

members of the United States Senate, the election of Black senators could be expected to
pay similar dividends at the federal level. The lack of Black senators, therefore, is a great
blow to the ambitions of the Black society in America.

Governmental Elements Derived From the State as a Political Unit

The state, as a political unit, has a number of attributes which make it politically
attractive compared to the smaller units contained within, such as cities, counties, and
congressional districts.

As previously noted, governors and senators are universally

elected statewide, and a majority group within the state has the ability to control these
elections with no support from members of any minority group. Majority groups control
the election of a majority of the members of the State legislature, and with the exception
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of Hawaii (which is anomalous in many respects) every state legislature in the United

States does have a majority-White legislature. Most state governments also play some
role in the appointment of their state's highest judicial body, although many states have
elected judges. In either case, the majority of the population will directly or indirectly
influence how judiciary positions are filled.
Each state has its own constitution, which defines and circumscribes the powers

of its government. While it is technically possible for states to arrange their governments
according to non-convention formulas, every state has chosen to establish legislative,
executive, and judicial branches, which roughly parallel those of the federal government.
In every case, the chief executive of the state is the governor of that state, although some
governors are essentially figureheads, with little real power to affect policy without the
consent of an elected cabinet or another branch. Others, however, have fairly extensive
powers to direct political activities within their states, and the powers of the governor can
be increased or reduced through changes in the constitution of a given state. Ardleigh
(2002) notes that governors have influence that extends beyond the borders of their home
state, as she asserts that "governor's races are important to the national parties because
governors are influential in the shaping of national policies on such issues as welfare
reform, education and taxes."

In addition, four out of the last five Presidents of the

United States have been elected as sitting governors, demonstrating that this office is an
effective stepping stone to even higher ambitions.
The amount of power accorded to state governments depends largely on the
geographic and historic resources within the state.

Individual state constitutions vary

widely in the allocation of powers of the state to governors, state legislatures, other
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elected or appointed offices within the state government, and in the amount of control
that state governments are able to exercise over counties and municipalities within the
state.

In most states, however, the constitution may be amended through referenda

initiated by petition and supported by a vote of the majority of the population, which can
effectively rewrite any of these elements. However the state may choose to divide up its
authority to control different aspects of the governing process, there are certain powers

granted by the federal government to the state as a unit that give the state critical control
over the effective political representation of minorities residing therein.
As previously noted, states control their own redistricting process, which can be
manipulated for the gain of the political party in control of the legislature.

Clayton

(2000) declares that redistricting "has always been about power. As a process, it has
always been controlled by the majority party in the state legislature.

In the twentieth-

century South, this has almost always meant that Democrats, who were usually in the
majority, would draw district boundaries to the disadvantage of Republicans. Moreover,
Democrats, the majority of whom were white, would also normally draw boundaries that
diluted black voting strength-even that of black Democrats-by not creating majority
black districts" (p. 3).

According to Hill (1995) and Swain (1995), this situation has

changed course over the past decade or so, as Republicans have sought to maximize their
advantage in Southern states by creating overwhelmingly Black districts, thus reducing
Black influence on the remaining White districts.
The state also has some limited power to determine election laws and residency
requirements, although much of that authority has been overtaken by the federal
government. For example, states were once able to set whatever residency requirements
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they desired, and Southern states used this capacity as a means by which to
disenfranchise Blacks.

However, Grofman et al. (1992) note that the "1970 [voting

rights] legislation... standardized residency requirements by placing a ban on state
residency requirements for federal elections of more than thirty days" (p. 19).

Felony Disenfranchisement:

One area where states still have broad discretion over the ability of persons to
vote is in the disenfranchisement of felons and ex-felons. The Constitution of the United
States allows individual states to determine if persons residing therein, having been
convicted of a felony, shall be declared ineligible to vote.

The laws regarding

disenfranchisement due to felony convictions vary widely from state to state.

Two

states-Maine and Vermont-do not disenfranchise felons at all, even while they are
serving prison sentences.

On the other end of the spectrum, eight states-Alabama,

Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, Virginia, and Wyoming-disenfranchise
convicted felons for life, even after they have served their sentence and any period of
probation or parole. Other states fall in between these extremes, almost all revoking the
right to vote for those who are serving prison sentences, and most removing this right
from those persons on probation or on parole. A handful of states restore the right to vote
or make it possible to be regained through a convoluted application process after a period
of several years following the end of the individual's sentence.
In every case, however, the proportion of African Americans thus disenfranchised
vastly outweighs the proportion of Whites. In those states that disenfranchise felons, the
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average statewide proportion of disenfranchised Blacks is approximately eight times the
proportion of disenfranchised Whites (The Sentencing Project, 2002). The Sentencing
Project (2002) notes, in fact, that in seven of the states which disenfranchise ex-felons,
"one in four black men is permanently disenfranchised" (italics are original).

Human

Rights Watch (2000) reports that Florida disenfranchises a particularly overwhelming
number of African Americans.

As of the year 2000, they state that among "Florida's

African American residents, the impact of the state's disenfranchisement laws is
particularly dramatic: 31.2% of black men in Florida -- more than 200,000 potential black
voters -- were excluded from the polls."

Supremacy of State Law Over Municipalities:

Control of counties and municipalities may give minorities the opportunity to
make decisions regarding local issues, but only to the degree that the state government is
willing to allow them such power. Stone and Pierannunzi (1997) note that the majorityWhite state government of Georgia has control over some key elements of civic policy in
the majority-Black city of Atlanta, stating that agencies of the state, "such as the
department of transportation, make critical decisions...

without much voice from

Atlanta's[Black] leaders" (p. 171). The earlier discussion of the revocation of powers
held by Black elected officials in Alabama examined by Barker et al. (1995) is another
example of the ability of the state government to interfere with the operations of
municipalities therein.
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In fact, there are countless opportunities for a state government to influence the
fortunes of cities and counties. Fleischmann (2000) summarizing the findings of David
Rusk, notes for example that "state annexation laws and suburban incorporations leave
inelastic cities unable to expand and thus surrounded in metropolitan areas fragmented
into numerous municipalities" (p. 110). He goes on to state that "as minority residents
and their influence increase, the inelastic cities over which they gain control may
represent an ever-diminishing share of their metropolitan areas. Indeed, they may preside
over the city's downward economic spiral and be desperate to secure private sector
investment" (p. 115). In some cases, cities are forced by financial circumstances to turn
to the state for support, giving the state additional leverage. According to Fleischmann
(2000): "An increased role for state governments in regional issues may bring mixed
results for minorities.

Given the growing differences between Democratic cities and

Republican suburbs, turning to the states as Rusk suggests may involve not only racial,
but partisan, disputes" (p. 125).

State governments derive revenue from various sources, such as income taxes,
property taxes, and fees for various licenses. This revenue is then reallocated according
to the desires of the state legislature, through a process that generally reflects the political
preferences of the party in the majority. The power to assess and reallocate revenues is a
powerful tool in the hands of the legislature and the governor, as is the ability to confer
this power to municipalities. The denial of needed funds can frustrate the plans of even
the most well-organized municipal government. On the other hand, access to state funds
combined with laws granting the ability to raise revenues independently can greatly
advance the fortunes of a city or county
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Control of Electoral Votes:

Black and Black (1992) assert that "because presidential elections are won by
carrying states, all of which adhere to the norm of 'winner takes all' in assigning electoral
votes to the winning party, the state is the critical political unit in presidential politics" (p.
11).

States also play a similar role in the process by which the parties nominate

presidential candidates, although this process is complicated by various factors. Primary
rules differ from state to state, some awarding delegates through proportional systems
and others using the same 'winner takes all' model that drives electoral politics.
Candidates also have more power in this process, as they may release their delegates
when it is clear that their campaign has become a lost cause, or they may pledge their
delegates to another candidate.
Barker et al (1999) note that, because of the nature of the electoral process, "the
potential political power of a group is enhanced if its population is strategically
distributed such that it can influence election results in the larger states... the size and
distribution of the black population could give the black community a strategic voice in
these areas, and by extension, significant national political influence" (p. 22). Berry and
Blassingame (1992) echo this sentiment, suggesting that the current distribution of
African American voters could be advantageous.

They state that the "structure of the

electoral college and the concentration of black voters in key states provided
opportunities for blacks to exercise leverage in a presidential election" (p. 632).
However, Frymer (1999) demonstrates how the Black minority can, in every
instance, be over-ruled by the White majority.
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He emphasizes as an example "the

national election [of 1984], Walter Mondale received more than 90 percent of the black
vote, but received only one-third of the white vote. Despite providing sizable minorities
of the vote in the South, black voters were unable to help Mondale win a single state in
the region... Contrary to the conventional wisdom that electoral groups benefit from their
concentrated numbers in key electoral college states, the influence of black voters over
the electorate did not increase in states where their numbers were highest" (pp. 111-2).
The only guarantee, therefore, of Black voters controlling the assignment of the electoral
votes of their state would be for Black voters to be the majority of voters in the state.
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CHAPTER III.
Examining a Possible Solution

The essential problem posed in the first two chapters is that of restoring what has
been taken from Black Americans through generations of slavery, decades of legally
sanctioned oppression, and continued discrimination: the sense of equal standing with all
other groups with whom they share this country. The current population of the United
States is roughly 281,421,000 people, of which approximately 36,419,000, or 12.94%,
are Black. In a truly color-blind nation, where all citizens had equal access to education
and economic and political opportunities, it would follow that an equal proportion of
elected officials would be Black. It would stand to reason, therefore, that there ought to
be twelve or thirteen Black senators, at least a half-dozen Black governors, and about
fifty-six Black congressmen, but none of these numbers are approached.
There are many possible responses to discrimination, including relocation.

In

theory, if the members of the Black population were to relocate themselves in careful
accordance with the population of the United States, it would be possible to establish a
majority-Black population in more than twenty states, and capture the gubernatorial,
senatorial, and electoral authority among them. However, the logistical and economic
problems posed by such an extreme program of relocation would make such an effort
wholly implausible. A far more plausible alternative would be for Black leaders to create
a movement focused on a single state, or a small group of states, and engineer the
relocation of a sufficient number of Black families to create a Black majority in the
designated state or states, which I will hereafter refer to as the 'settlement strategy.'
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Majority and Minority Group Strategies

There are two distinct dynamics inherent to the relationship between a minority
group and the majority group within a given society.

First, there are a number of

strategies which members of a minority group may choose to employ in order to cope
with their minority status. Individuals within a group may employ different strategies,
but there will likely be a particular strategy which tends to dominate the group's approach
to their situation.

Second, and at the same time, members of the majority group will

employ their own set of strategies to deal with the presence of the minority group.
Feagin and Sikes (1994) state that from "the beginning of slavery African Americans
have gone beyond individual strategies to consider what they as a group should be doing
to deal with external racism and its internal effects on black communities.

Among

middle-class black men and women today one still finds a recurring concern with
community and collective action" (p. 346).

This analysis indicates that there is a

particularly strong cohesion among African Americans, which is to be expected of a
group that has been collectively subjected to an extended period of social traumatization.
Robertson (1987) identifies six basic strategies which a majority group is likely to
follow in dealing with a minority presence. These are: pluralism; distinct legal protection
of the minority group; assimilation; population transference or exile; subjugation; and
extermination. The practice of pluralism embodies the acceptance by the majority group
of the minority group within their midst, without efforts to assimilate or subjugate the
minority. While this approach is often purported to be the American ideal, the current
status of Blacks in America is the second, distinct legal protection, which is afforded in
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response to continuing racism in American society. Robertson notes that assimilation can
be voluntary or forced, but fails to distinguish encouraged assimilation from forced
assimilation as separate strategies. As has been previously noted, Blacks have generally
chosen to resist complete assimilation, preferring to maintain their ethnic identity. At the
same time, those Blacks who have made the effort to attempt to assimilate have often
found themselves blocked by Whites unwilling to afford them this entry. The schemes to
resettle freed slaves in Africa, Panama, or Haiti would have constituted population
transfer, had they been carried out. Prior to the Civil War, Blacks in the South were
formally and completely subjugated, while those in the North were subjugated to some
degree in their treatment as inferiors.
Lavender (1999) identifies eight basic strategies by which members of a minority
group can deal with their minority status.

These are self-hatred; self-segregation or

ghettoization; stigma redemption; covering (temporary passing); passing (permanent),
which is akin to assimilation; correction; stigma conversion; and confrontation (pp. 31517). These definitions are not specific to ethnic minorities, but are also intended to apply
to persons who are stigmatized in some way by some elements of society. Some of these
responses are available to Blacks and used readily. One example is stigma conversion,
which is the changing of a 'bad' attribute into good by using it in a positive sense, as
embodied by the Black pride movement of the 1960s, which produced the motto, 'Black
is Beautiful.'

Other strategies available to Blacks in general include self-segregation,

self-hatred, confrontation, and stigma redemption, which is a spiritual approach in which
the minority group member accepts bad treatment in 'this' world, believing that they will
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be rewarded in the 'next' world for being a good person, despite the bad treatment which
they have received.
The strategies of passing and covering can only be applied to the degree that
individual members of the minority group are physically able to convince others that they
are actually member of the majority group, which is rarely an option for those with
discernable Black ancestry. Stigma correction, in which a member of a minority group
accepts the larger society's definition of his or her status as being 'bad' and changes that
associated behavior in order to be accepted, is also not available to Blacks. It is possible
for an individual to change his or her behavior, and some minorities do attempt to adopt
the culture of the majority group in order to increase their individual opportunities for
success. However, it is nearly impossible for an individual to 'correct' the fact of their
physical appearance, particularly when the physical attributes of the majority and
minority groups are so distinctly different. No amount of behavioral change can protect a
person who is Black from being categorized as Black by a White person who intends to
use that classification as a basis for discrimination.
Members of an ethnic minority may turn to the extreme end of self-segregation,
which is relocation, the complete abandonment of the majority society by the minority
group.

Lavender (1999) notes that "some activists have called for ghettoization on a

larger scale by supporting, for example, an all-black state or nation" (p. 316). Meier and
Rudwick (1976) describe the history of Black responses to the sense of oppression
inherent in their situation as "ranging along a continuum of ideologies from assimilation
to nationalism.

At one end of this continuum have been the advocates of complete

biological amalgamation and cultural assimilation with members of the dominant society,
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and the complete disappearance of blacks as a racial group. At the other end have been
those who advocated complete withdrawal from American society and the creation of
independent Negro states" (pp. 118-9). Lusane (1994), however, suggests that the current
strategy of the Black community in general includes a particular focus on gaining power
through holding elected offices. He states: "Unlike many Black radicals of the 1960s, the
current group [of Black activists] sees political and tactical value of electoral politics...
the new radical leaders recognize that to engage in electoral politics does not mean an
abandonment of non-electoral struggles and strategies" (p. 39).

Lusane (1994) does

recognize, however, that "the conditions of the masses of Black make it clear that just
putting African Americans in office is no guarantee of social progress... it can be argued
that just to focus on electing Blacks diverts financial resources, time, leadership skills,
and energy from developing strategies that, in the end, will be more beneficial to the
Black community in the long run" (p. 35).
Migration is not discussed as a large scale strategy, but a closer examination of
Black migration patterns in this century yields a different understanding. As has been
previously noted, the massive Black migration from the South to the North at the
beginning of the

2 0 th

Century was an effort (albeit uncoordinated) to escape the fervent

racism of the South. The current return migration from North to South, which will be
discussed in greater detail in this chapter, is motivated in part by urban Blacks seeking to
escape the poverty and degradation of the Northern inner cities.
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Other Cases of State Control by Minority Groups

There are some previous examples of minority groups exercising the power of
control over a state government to their own benefit.

In fact, there is one distinct

example of a minority group engaging in a mass relocation quite similar to the strategy
under examination here, in order to secure the political benefits of statehood. This can be
found in the case of the Mormon migration to and settlement in Utah. The Mormons, as
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints are commonly known, are a
religious order which was founded in 1830. Their founder was a farmer in New York
named Joseph Smith, who claimed to have discovered new additions to the scriptures,
and to have been designated as a prophet by an angel name Moroni. Barone et al. (2002)
explain that the group "attracted thousands of converts and created their own
communities; persecuted for their beliefs, they moved west to Ohio, Missouri and then
Illinois" (p. 1521).

Shortly after announcing a revelation that endorsed the practice of

polygamy, Joseph Smith was murdered by a mob in the Mormon settlement of Nauvoo,
Illinois, in 1844.

The next Mormon leader, Brigham Young, responded in 1847 by

initiating a "well-organized march across the Great Plains and into the Rocky Mountains"
(Barone et al., 2002, p. 1521). Once there, Young and his followers settled in a part of
the United States that was, at that time, still part of a vast and unincorporated territory.
Once the Mormons had established a sufficiently large population, they lobbied
for statehood in 1849. "The object of religious fear and prejudice," Barone et al. (2002)
write, "Utah was not granted statehood until 1896, after the church renounced polygamy"
(p. 1521). Since that time, every governor, senator, and representative elected from Utah
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has been a Mormon, as have a sizable majority of the members of the state legislature.
Mormons have also routinely been elected to the Senate from several surrounding states,
giving that group a vastly over-representative presence in the Senate. Currently there are
five Mormon Senators-including two from Utah, and each from Idaho, Nevada, and
Oregon--coming from a group with a population of roughly 5.5 million members, or
slightly less than 2% of the U.S. population. Barone et al. (2002) note that, consistent
with conservative Mormon social views, Utah has been one of the most solidly
Republican states in every presidential election since 1968.
Hawaii is another state where minority-majority status has yielded consistent
representation by members of two groups which are nationally considered to be
minorities, but which exercise a controlling majority in one state.

With one early

exception, Hawaii has sent only Asians and native Hawaiians to the U.S. Senate since it
was granted statehood, in 1959.

These senators have consistently been liberal

Democrats, and Hawaii's electoral votes have gone to Democrats in all but two
presidential elections.

This liberal political history reflects what Barone et al. (2002)

refer to as "a certain Polynesian attitude toward life" (p. 465), which is embodied in "a
heritage of tolerance and openness to cultural diversity second to none" (p. 467). Barone
et al. (2002) maintain that "it was Hawaii's super-American tolerance that inspired
segregationist Southern Democrats to block its admission to the Union for years" (pp.
465-66).

In relation to the strategy discussed in this thesis, however, it is important to

note that Hawaii has always had a majority non-White population.
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Can it be done?

The establishment of a majority-Black state has been suggested before, and has
even been attempted at least once. To be fair then, a critic of this strategy might ask why
it might succeed now when it has failed in the past.

The answer lies largely in the

changes that have occurred in society particularly over the past few decades. At the time
of Edwin McCabe's doomed effort, it was entirely possible for Whites to develop
schemes by which they could deprive Blacks of the right to vote.

Because Blacks

generally had not previously been granted this right, denying them access to it was
socially acceptable behavior.
In this era, a generation after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, Blacks and
Whites alike are accustomed to the idea that people should be and will be allowed to
vote. The vast majority of Blacks who wish to vote in this country are now able to do so
unhindered, despite minor incidents such as overzealous purging of ex-felons from the
voter rolls, which tends to affect a higher proportion of Blacks than Whites. Similarly, it
is now generally understood that Blacks can move where they wish, and can not overtly
be prevented from living in a particular neighborhood, and certainly can not be hindered
from moving into a particular state.
Another factor that points to an increased chance of success is the availability of
resources. At the time of McCabe's migration, almost all Blacks had only recently been
emancipated from slavery, and most had virtually no money and few possessions. There
was only a very tiny Black middle class of artisans and professionals, and certainly no
Blacks were among the upper-echelons of the very wealthy.
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Despite the fact that

modern-day Blacks, on the average, still have less wealth than members of other ethnic
groups, the Black community today has access to more financial resources than ever
before. There exists a solid Black middle class, and some Black athletes and entertainers
have achieved truly phenomenal wealth, and have demonstrated their willingness to
direct some of there towards the betterment of the Black community, although these
efforts are usually very localized. A number of institutional resources could be used in
the implementation of the settlement strategy.

Black-owned businesses and similar

economic institutions could work towards financing this strategy and could focus on
establishing jobs in the target state and expanding of economic opportunities in existing
majority-Black areas within that state. Black churches and historically Black colleges
and universities could serve as important points of communication and coordination, as
they have often done in past Black social movements. The exact degree to which each of
these resources would be able to contribute to a settlement movement is yet another topic
which could be richly examined in future research.
The concept of establishing a majority-Black state is not entirely unknown to
modern Black leaders. This idea has, in fact been advocated in recent decades, to be
achieved not through settlement, but by the granting of statehood to the District of
Columbia. Swain (1995) describes how the Congressional Black Caucus "has for a long
time pursued statehood for the District of Columbia, and this goal is related to the pursuit
of higher office by blacks. If the District is granted its statehood, blacks will have a
chance to attain... governorship and two senatorial seats" (p. 221).

This strategy,

however, would rely on the cooperation of White supporters, as the change in status of a
district or territory requires the consent of the U.S. Congress. Ardent promotion of this
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goal has met with failure, which further indicates that African Americans seeking
consistent representation in the Senate and among the state governors may need to rely on
the settlement strategy. In order to determine whether such a strategy is feasible, it is first
necessary to determine exactly how many people would have to move from one state to
another, how far they would have to move, and if it is likely that enough people would be
willing to make such a move.

Calculating the Differential by State

In order to figure out how many Black immigrants a state would need to absorb in
order to attain majority-Black status, it is first necessary to settle the issue of who exactly
is Black.

One dilemma that presented itself in interpreting the 2000 Census was a

change-albeit one that makes the data more reflective of reality-in the classifications
offered by the Census itself. In previous administrations, respondents were required to
select one race, including the choices of 'White' and 'Black, African American, or
Negro,' which we will simply call 'Black.'

In the 2000 Census, however, respondents

were allowed for the first time to select as many races as apply to them, leading to a
disparity between those who only indicated that they were Black and those who merely
included this classification as one of several choices.

For the purposes of this paper,

respondents who only indicated that they were Black will henceforth be referred to as
'Black Only,' while those who indicated Black in combination with anything else will be
referred to as 'Mixed Black.' The total population of respondents who indicated that they
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were any part Black, including all who indicated Black Only and Mixed Black will be
referred to as 'Black Any,' and general reference to Blacks will indicate this complete
group as well, unless otherwise noted.
According to the Bureau of the Census, "the most common combinations were
'Black and White' (45 percent), followed by 'Black and Some Other Race' (24 percent),
'Black and American Indian and Alaskan Native' (10 percent), and 'Black and White
and American Indian and Alaskan Native' (6 percent)" (McKinnon, 2001).

There are

four primary scenarios for individuals choosing to categorize themselves as mixed.
Either they had categorized themselves as Black in the previous Census, and are using the
new allowances of the current Census to indicate a heretofore undenoted mixture in their
ancestry; or they had categorized themselves

as something other than Black in the

previous Census, and are now taking the opportunity to acknowledge their Black
ancestry; or they were not old enough to fill out the Census form in 1990, and their racial
category was selected by the parent or parents who filled out the form on their behalf; or
they were born after 1990, and have been listed for the first time as being of mixed race
by the parent or parents who filled out the form on their behalf.
An entire paper could be written on the varieties of respondents who made the
decision to choose Black as one of multiple categories, but the dilemma remains as to
how to consider them for the purposes of gauging Black political aptitudes. While it is
certainly possible to assume that people of mixed race may simply identify as being of
mixed race, or may prefer to affiliate themselves with the majority race in order to secure
the benefits of majority status, the fact is that neither practice has necessarily been
followed in the United States.
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The traditional legal and social response in the United States would be that any
person who falls into one of these Mixed Black categories is Black. According to Davis
(1991):
The nation's answer to the question "Who is black?" has long been that a
black is any person with any known African black ancestry. This
definition reflects the long experience with slavery and later with Jim
Crow segregation. In the South it became known as the "one-drop rule,"
meaning that a single drop of "black blood" makes a person a black. It is
also known as the "one black ancestor rule," some courts have called it the

"traceable amount rule," and anthropologists call it the "hypo-descent
rule," meaning that racially mixed persons are assigned the status of the

subordinate group. (p. 5).

The 'one-drop' rule is a social construct, based on popular pseudo-scientific
myths propounded in the 1800s, which is unique to Black Americans. Davis (1991) notes
that, "Americans... while finding other ways to discriminate against immigrant groups,
have rejected the application of the drastic one-drop rule to all groups but blacks," and he
explains that this rule "is found only in the United States and not in any other nation in
the world" (p. 13). Historically, some persons who appear White but have some Black
ancestry have taken steps to hide their Black ancestry and thus attain the privileges of
being White, a process called 'passing.'

Lavender (2000b) describes passing in detail:

"The person who uses passing as a response to discrimination is able, because of lack of
characteristics identifying the person as a member of the discrimination group as a
member of their group." He goes on to explain that "the classic example in the United
States is the person who is legally or socially classified as black but who, because of light
color, can move to another area where the individual is unknown and be accepted as
white" (p. 316). In discussions of race, as opposed to other types of social classification
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such as religion or sexual orientation, the one-drop rule is applied to no group other than
Blacks. Because of this distinction, Davis (1991) suggests that the "concept of passing
applies only to blacks" (p. 14).
My intention in dealing with this question is essentially to apply this 'one-drop'
rule by assuming that, in our racially divided society, any respondent who is willing to
acknowledge that they have some Black heritage is more likely to identify with and be
sympathetic to the political plight of Blacks. Davis notes that when the task of racial
categorization in the U.S. Census shifted from the Census taker to the respondent, "this
did not seem to introduce any noticeable fluctuation in the number of blacks, thus
indicating that black Americans generally apply the one-drop rule to themselves" (p. 12).
Davis notes, however, that Hispanics and American Indians with some Black ancestry
"generally reject the one-drop rule if they can," (p. 12), indicating that members of these
groups who have Black ancestry but do not identify with Blacks would likely avoid
admitting this, and probably would not indicate their Black ancestry on the Census.
The one-drop rule, therefore, is generally accepted by Blacks, some of whom
"support it to keep from losing members of their group to the dominant white group"
(Lavender, 2000a, p. 742). Persons who wish to reject or deny Black ancestry (and are
physically able to get away with it) will do so, and will subsequently not formally
acknowledge this heritage. These factors point towards the much greater likelihood of
those who define themselves in the Census as some form of Mixed Blacks identifying as
Black, regardless of other elements of their ancestry. As noted above, fewer than half of
all Mixed Black respondents identified themselves as 'Black and White,' and more than
one third did not indicate that they had any White ancestry at all.

83

Mixed respondents

with no acknowledged White heritage would have no reason to identify with Whites at
all, and it is certainly more likely that they would be politically aligned with Blacks.
It is also interesting to note that, as the Black proportion of a state population
increases, the proportion of Black respondents who indicate that they are of mixed
heritage goes down. The mean percentage of Mixed Black as a proportion of the total
Black population for the top 20 states by Black proportion, which are the only states with
Black proportions higher than 10%, is 3.3144, with a standard deviation of 1.7527; while
the mean percentage of Mixed Black as a proportion of the total Black population for the
20 states with less than 5% Black proportion is 23.0118, with a standard deviation of
8.5949. A linear regression analysis of these variables indicates that an increase in 1% of
the Black proportion of the population of a state corresponds with a decrease of more
than 6.18 in the proportion of Black Any Census respondents who claim to have a Mixed
Black heritage, with an impressive R-squared of 0.466. This might be indicative of the
segregated nature of the Southern states which happen to have the highest Black
proportions, where miscegenation has historically been frowned upon and the progeny of
such activity is frequently classified as being only Black.

This premise seems to be

slightly bolstered by the fact that if we examine only those thirteen states which have
proportions higher than 10% Black and which are categorized as Southern by Census
region, the mean percentage of Mixed Black as a proportion of the total Black population
of these states drops to 2.4792, with a standard deviation of 1.4010.
In such cases, Blacks may be inclined to formally deny their White lineage,
although they may be aware of it and willing to discuss it in an informal context. It is
also important to note that in those states where miscegenation has been strictly
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discouraged in the past (and is still frowned upon in some social circles), individuals who
are apparently Black or apparently White may have a mixed race background of which
they are completely unaware, or which they may suspect but be unable to prove. As
Davis (1991) notes, "most parents of black American children in recent decades have
themselves been racially mixed, but often the fractions get complicated because earlier
details of the mixing were obscured generations ago" (p.6). In either case, the superior
social status of Whites also suggests the likelihood that a much lower proportion of
people who generally consider themselves to be White would be willing to acknowledge
Black ancestry, compared to the proportion of Blacks who would be willing to
acknowledge that they have some White ancestry.
Another factor that is likely to influence the proportion of Mixed Blacks among
the entire Black population is the increased level of interaction with members of other
groups by a minority as that minority becomes a smaller proportion of the whole
population. In a state with a large Black population, it is easier for Blacks to interact
almost exclusively with other Blacks. On the other hand, in a state where only a very
small percentage of people are Black, members of that minority group will have a much
higher likelihood of interactions with members of other groups, including relationships
and marriages.

In such a state, Blacks will be less likely to be seen as a threat to the

social, economic, and political order, and may be more accepted at all levels of society.
Based on the preceding analysis, I feel that it is appropriate to use the 'Black Any'
numbers in discussions of state populations and changes therein. Wherever it is germane,
however, I will provide figures indicating both the 'Black Only' and 'Black Any'
outcomes of a given scenario.

85

Having settled, for the time being, the question of how to calculate the Black
population, this analysis now turns to the actual calculation of the number of Black
people who would need to move into a state in order to affect a majority. It is important
to recognize that a simple majority of the population does not, by itself guarantee
political control.

Grofman et al. (1992) note, for example, that "minority populations

most often have lower levels of eligibility, registration, and turnout than do majority
populations... it has been known for some time that creating districts in which a minority
group has a bare majority of the population is unlikely to provide a realistic chance of
electing a candidate preferred by the minority community" (p. 118). They conclude that
"if a district is created in which it is estimated that half of the actual voters will be
minority members, it is not certain that this will effectively equalize the opportunity of
the majority and minority communities to elect candidates of their choice... even an
'effective majority' may not be adequate to provide a realistic opportunity to elect
candidates of choice, as such a purely numerical threshold does not take into account
financial and other disadvantages faced by minority (or minority-backed) candidates and
does not take into account the advantages of incumbency, which are often held by
nonminorities" (p. 121).
In determining the number that would be needed to assure political determination
for the minority group, Grofman et al. (1992) apply a formula that accounts for age,
citizenship, and consistent levels of registration and turnout.

They determine that

"effective voting equality for blacks may at times require little more than 50 percent of
the total population, though the usual requirement is for between 55 and 60 percent, and
the figure is sometimes as high as 65 percent" (p. 119). Canon (1999) ties this figure to
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regional race relations, stating that in some areas, "where racial bloc voting is especially
severe, a 60-65 percent black population may be required to ensure the election of a black
representative... given the differential turnout rates of blacks and whites" (pp 9-10).
Lusane (1994) suggests that lower rates of Black political participation are
partially the result of the sentiment shared by members of these communities that they do
not have a real impact on their plight. "Partially out of sheer frustration and partially out
of exercising a conscious political decision," Lusane writes, "voter registration and
turnout in low-income Black communities are often severely depressed" (p. 64). Frymer
(1999) adds to this his assertion that Blacks do not even have influence within the
Democratic Party congruent with their level of support for Democratic candidates, stating
that those "who are marginalized from the political system do not vote; those who do not
vote are neglected even further" (p. 131).
Although a variety of factors might play into the ability of Blacks to command an
actual voting majority, we will assume for the purposes of this thesis that the traditional
majority of 'fifty percent plus one' will be sufficient. It can be inferred from the nature
of the settlement strategy itself that those Blacks who are willing to relocate as part of
this strategy will also be willing to take the necessary steps to become registered and
participate in elections in the state in which they settle. Furthermore, it is unnecessary to
consider the age of the populations in question, as it is reasonable to expect that this
strategy would take at least several years to enact.

Therefore, it is likely that some of

those who are not old enough to vote at the beginning of the migration process may well
have reached the necessary age by the time a majority is achieved.

Although further

investigations might unearth contradictory information, we will assume for the purposes
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of this thesis that a bare majority will be sufficient for Blacks to assume political control
over a state, recognizing that it may later be discovered that a greater majority is required.
The actual number of Black voters that would have to be added to establish a
majority of all voters shall hereafter be referred to as the 'population differential.'

This

figure can be calculated quite simply, by subtracting the total Black population of the
state from the total non-Black population of the state. Table IV, which is distributed over
the following two pages, contains these calculations for each of the 50 states, plus the
District of Columbia, ranked from lowest to highest. Of course, the District of Columbia
is not a state - if it were, the strategy examined herein would be unnecessary!
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Table IV.
Calculation of Differentials
(the number of Black who would need to move into a state
in order to establish a Black majority within that state)

ranked from lowest to highest.
Total
Population
572,059
783,600

Non-Black
Population
221,604
626,448

Black Any
Population
350,455
157,152

Population
Differential
-128,851
469,296

Wyoming
Alaska

493,782
626,932

488,919
599,785

4,863
27,147

484,056
572,638

Vermont

608,827

604,335

4,492

599,843

North Dakota

642,200

636,828

5,372

631,456

South Dakota
Mississippi
Montana
Rhode Island
Hawaii

754,844
2,844,658
902,195
1,048,319
1,211,537

748,157
1,802,950
897,754
990,268
1,178,194

6,687
1,041,708
4,441
58,051
33,343

741,470
761,242
893,313
932,217
1,144,851

New Hampshire
Maine
Idaho
Louisiana
Nebraska

1,235,786
1,274,923
1,293,953
4,468,976
1,711,263

1,223,568
1,265,370
1,285,826
3,000,659
1,635,430

12,218
9,553
8,127
1,468,317
75,833

1,211,350
1,255,817
1,277,699
1,532,342
1,559,597

South Carolina

4,012,012

2,811,111

1,200,901

1,610,210

West Virginia

1,808,344

1,745,527

62,817

1,682,710

Nevada
New Mexico

1,998,257
1,819,046

1,847,749
1,776,634

150,508
42,412

1,697,241
1,734,222

Arkansas
Alabama
Utah
Maryland
Kansas

2,673,400
4,447,100
2,233,169
5,296,486
2,688,418

2,246,248
3,278,102
2,208,787
3,771,450
2,517,808

427,152
1,168,998
24,382
1,525,036
170,610

1,819,096
2,109,104
2,184,405
2,246,414
2,347,198

Connecticut

3,405,565

3,066,487

339,078

2,727,409

STATE
District of Col.
Delaware

Source: U.S. Census
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Table IV. (cont.)
Calculation of Differentials
(the number of Black who would need to move into a state
in order to establish a Black majority within that state)
ranked from lowest to highest.

Total
Population
2,926,324

Non-Black
Population
2,853,812

Black Any
Population
72,512

Population
Differential
2,781,300

Oklahoma
Oregon

3,450,654
3,421,399

3,165,888
3,348,752

284,766
72,647

2,881,122
3,276,105

Georgia
Kentucky
Tennessee
Colorado
Virginia

8,186,453
4,041,769
5,689,283
4,301,261
7,078,515

5,793,028
3,729,891
4,735,934
4,110,544
5,637,308

2,393,425
311,878
953,349
190,717
1,441,207

3,399,603
3,418,013
3,782,585
3,919,827
4,196,101

Missouri
North Carolina
Minnesota

5,595,211
8,049,313
4,919,479

4,939,834
6,273,030
4,716,507

655,377
1,776,283
202,972

4,284,457
4,496,747
4,513,535

Wisconsin

5,363,675

5,037,169

326,506

4,710,663

Arizona
Indiana

5,130,632
6,080,485

4,945,033
5,542,470

185,599
538,015

4,759,434
5,004,455

Washington

5,894,121

5,655,723

238,398

5,417,325

Massachusetts
New Jersey
Michigan
Illinois
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Florida

6,349,097
8,414,350
9,938,444
12,419,293
11,353,140
12,281,054
15,982,378

5,950,618
7,202,600
8,463,831
10,481,622
9,980,639
10,991,931
13,510,648

398,479
1,211,750
1,474,613
1,937,671
1,372,501
1,289,123
2,471,730

5,552,139
5,990,850
6,989,218
8,543,951
8,608,138
9,702,808
11,038,918

New York

18,976,457

15,742,292

3,234,165

12,508,127

Texas
California

20,851,820
33,871,648

18,358,763
31,358,607

2,493,057
2,513,041

15,865,706
28,845,566

STATE
Iowa

Source: U.S. Census

90

The importance of several figures within this table is immediately apparent. The
first is the differential in the District of Columbia, which is a negative number because
Blacks are already in the majority therein. The second is the differential in Delaware,
which is only 469,296, the lowest of any state.

The third item worth noting is the

differential in Mississippi, which is 761,242. This is important because Mississippi has
the lowest differential of any state in the South, and in the context of the total population
of Mississippi, which is over 36% Black. It is also important to note the differentials in
California, Texas, New York, and Florida all of which are in excess of 10,000,000 (with
California's exceeding 28,000,000).

The settlement of these states would probably

present an insurmountable challenge, despite the fact that they are also the four states
with the highest Black populations. The Black population of any one of these states,
however, is sufficient to establish a Black majority in the top four states with the lowest
differentials; the Black population of these four states combined is sufficient to establish
Black majorities in the top twelve states with the lowest differentials.
In fact, if the Black population of the United States had sufficient resources,
coordination, and unity of purpose to redistribute itself from all of the states with the
highest differentials (many of which are large states with very large Black populations)
to all of the states with the lowest differentials, they could in this way attain majority
status in no fewer than twenty-three states, yielding control of 46 Senate seats, 68
Representative seats (albeit at the cost of any seats held in the states from which they
would initially be moving), and 117 electoral votes, which is roughly one fifth of the
entire electoral college.
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Such a redistribution would, in any practical sense, be impossible. The resources
do not exist to enable it, and even if they did, there are bound to be many Blacks who
would be ideologically opposed to such a strategy, and many, many more who simply
would not wish to relocate because they are happy where they are. However, the fact that
such a feat is technically possible does highlight the comparative ease with which a Black
majority could be established through a relatively small migration to a state with a very
low differential.

Another way of thinking about these numbers is to examine the

percentage of Blacks who are living outside a state who would have to move into that
state in order to establish a majority. Table V, on the following page, demonstrates that
in some cases, this percentage is surprisingly low.
Five states would require less than 2% of the total Black population outside of
those states to relocate in order to establish a Black majority.

While some of those

states-particularly Wyoming, Alaska, and North Dakota-are far removed from areas
where the Black population is heavily concentrated, Delaware and Vermont are not.
Mississippi and Rhode Island are also reasonably close to some of the prominent centers
of the Black population.
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Table V.

Percentage of Blacks* living outside a state required to
move into that state in order to achieve a Black majority,
ranked from lowest to highest.
STATE

%

Delaware
Wyoming
Alaska
Vermont
North Dakota
South Dakota
Mississippi
Montana

1.294
1.329
1.574
1.647
1.734
2.036
2.152
2.453

Iowa
Oklahoma
Oregon
Kentucky
Georgia
Tennessee
Colorado
Missouri

7.652
7.973
9.013
9.466
9.991
10.665
10.820
11.980

Rhode Island

2.564

Virginia

11.996

Hawaii
New Hampshire
Maine
Idaho
Nebraska
Louisiana
South Carolina
West Virginia
Nevada
New Mexico

3.146
3.327
3.449
3.509
4.291
4.384
4.572
4.628
4.680
4.767

Minnesota
North Carolina
Wisconsin
Arizona
Indiana
Washington
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Michigan
Ohio

12.463
12.980
13.051
13.135
13.947
14.973
15.414
17.016
20.001
24.562

Arkansas

5.054

Illinois

24.778

Alabama

5.983

Pennsylvania

27.619

Utah
Maryland

6.002
6.438

Florida
New York

32.517
37.692

Kansas

6.475

Texas

46.765

Connecticut

7.559

California

85.074

STATE

* Calculated by Black Any population.
Source: U.S. Census
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%

The percentage of all Blacks who would need to move into the states with very
low differentials appears very small indeed when viewed in this context. But how large
is the differential relative to the number of Blacks who would be willing and able to
move to another state in order to create a majority-Black state? The question of whether
or not Blacks would be willing to move on the scale necessary to affect a majority in a
given state can be answered in part by looking at the actual mobility of Blacks as reported
by the United States Census, and by analyzing data from the General Social Survey
(GSS). Census data reveals that Blacks move from state to state in very high numbers,
although not in consistently higher proportions than Whites. Table VI, on the following
page, indicates the number of people moving from state to state in three randomly
selected years during the 1990s, as reported by the U.S. Census. The table contains data
for those who moved from one state to another within one of the nine Census divisions,
as well as the total number of people who moved from any state to any other state.
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Table VI.

Interstate Mobility by Race
in randomly selected years.

Different State,
same division b

Total

Total state to
state movers

As % of
total pop.

1999-2000a

All Races

270,219,000

4,062,000

8,428,000

3.119%

White

221,703,000

2,992,000

6,701,000

3.023%

Black

34,948,000

807,000

1,264,000

3.617%

%Black

12.93%

19.87%

15.00%

1995-1996 a
All Races

260,406,000

3,113,000

6,471,000

2.485%

White

215,344,000

2,692,000

5,516,000

2.561%

Black

33,294,000

291,000

651,000

1.955%

% Black
1992-1993

12.79%

9.35%

10.06%

All Races
White

253,069,000
208,754,000

3,393,000
1,956,000

7,480,000
5,689,000

2.956%
2.725%

Black

31,366,000

401,000

779,000

2.484%

%Black

12.39%

11.82%

10.41%

a

a. from May 1 st of the first year to May 1S of the second year
b. Census divisions are as follows:
New England - Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont
Middle Atlantic - New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
East North Central - Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin
West North Central - Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North and South Dakota
South Atlantic - Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Maryland, North and South Carolina,
East South Central - Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee
West South Central - Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas
Mountain - Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming
Pacific - Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
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Of particular interest to this analysis is the fact that in any given year, a sufficient
number of Blacks move from one state to another to establish majorities in many of the
states as calculated in Table IV, if this migration was targeted and coordinated. The
average number of Black state-to-state movers in the three years examined is 898,000, or
2.685% of the total Black population of America in a given year, which is enough to
establish a majority in any of the first eight states in Table IV. Even the number for the
lowest year, 651,000 in 1995-96, would be sufficient to establish a majority in any of the
first five states in Table IV.
Having established that Blacks do indeed move from state to state in sufficient
numbers that this strategy could be enacted if typical Black migration was coordinated
towards this end, we now move to the question of whether or not Blacks would be willing
to move for the specific purpose of establishing a majority in a state. There is no direct
date to suggest the answer to this question one way or another. However, there is at least
some indirect data to be gleaned from 1996 administration of the General Social Survey,
which asked respondents the following question:
If you could improve your work or living conditions,
how willing or unwilling would you be to...
A. Move to another neighborhood (or village)
B. Move to another town or city within this state
C. Move to another state
D. Move outside America
E. Move outside North America

The question of greatest concern to this strategy is the degree to which Black
respondents would be willing to move to another state. Table VII on the following page
demonstrates that Blacks respondents indicate a significant willingness do so.
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Table VII.
Willingness of GSS respondents to move to another
state in order to 'improve work or living conditions'
White

Black

N

%

N

%

Very Willing

209

19.62

46

27.06

Willing

250

23.47

36

21.18

Neutral

158

14.84

22

12.94

Unwilling

193

18.12

14

8.24

Very Unwilling

255

23.94

52

30.59

TOTAL

1065

100.00

170

100.00

Source: General Social Survey, 1996

As this data shows, nearly half of all Black respondents indicated that they would
be willing to move to a different state for improved working or living conditions, with
over 27% indicating that they would be 'very willing' to make such a move. This seems
to agree with the data on actual migration from the U.S. Census. While people may be
prompted to move from one location to another for many different reasons, presumably
the belief that a better life is to be found at their destination would be among the more
compelling motivations. Projected to the whole of the adult Black population, it would
indicate that some 5,974,000 Black adults would be 'very willing' to move to another
state, which would be enough to establish a majority in any state in Table IV except for
the nine states with the highest differentials; and that close to 10,650,000-enough
establish a majority in any state in Table IV except for California, Texas, New York, and
Florida-would at least be 'willing' to make such a move.
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Of course, such a leap of analysis assumes several things-first and foremost that
Blacks would consider moving for the purpose of creating a majority-Black state to be
tantamount to moving 'improve work or living conditions.' Whether or not Blacks would
expect to attain an improvement in their living or working conditions by moving to a
majority-Black state, or a state intended to become majority-Black state, is another

question that must be reserved for further research. Because the idea of establishing a
majority-Black state has not been popularly discussed in more than a generation, it is
doubtful that many Blacks have ever thought about whether they would move to a state
for the purpose of creating a Black majority, or even whether they would move to a state
that already had such a majority.

How Can a Group Best Achieve a Voting Majority In a State?

The first question that arises in the examination of the viability and efficacy of
this strategy is: what state would make the most logical choice for settlement? A wide
variety of factors must be considered in order to develop an answer to this question, some
tied to practical logistical matters, and others related to the political goals of this
endeavor. Logistical concerns include those of the existing population of a target state
and the surrounding area. Would it be better to settle a small state, thus minimizing the
necessary resources, or to settle a fairly large state, and thus obtain the benefits of
perhaps eight or ten additional seats in the House of Representatives?
infrastructure of the state capable of absorbing a large immigration?
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Is the

Would Blacks

benefit more by settling a very conservative state which produces members of the U.S.

House and Senate who oppose Black issues, or a more liberal state where they would
meet less resistance and could more easily form governing coalitions?
An assessment of the viability of a state for settlement must begin with an
estimation of the effort that would be required to establish a simple Black majority of all
eligible voters.

The Black proportion of the population in a particular state could

theoretically be increased by a number of means, although the most practical would be
through migration. Increased intermarriage, for example, would produce more biracial
children who would be identified as Black according to the 'one-drop'

rule.

Identification of the descendents of Blacks who have passed as White would have this
effect also, although such a strategy might backfire if pursued vigorously-persons with
undiscovered Black ancestry who have identified as White all their lives would not
necessarily begin to identify with Blacks simply because some Black ancestry is exposed.
Instead, they may choose to completely deny this heritage, or may push for a change in
the definition of Blackness that moves away from the one-drop rule itself.
Many states have a small proportion of people residing therein who are not
citizens of that state, but who choose instead to maintain their citizenship in another state
such as their state where they were born. They may identify with that other state and
possibly even vote there via absentee ballot, but might at the same time meet all of the
qualifications for citizenship in the state where they are actually living.

Some small

impact might result from encouraging Black noncitizen residents of a state to take the
necessary steps to become citizens within that state. As a long-term strategy, it could
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even be suggested that increased life expectancy and mortality rates of Blacks through
improved medical care would accelerate the growth of the Black population.
Migration into a state, however, is clearly the fastest, simplest, and most practical
way to achieve a Black majority. As Clayton (2000) says, the "increase in the number of
blacks serving in Congress is the result of a variety of factors. The migration of black
America has played a critical role in shaping the political landscape of America" (p. 22).
One strategy that could work in tandem with a migration, albeit with some obvious
negative possible repercussions, would be aggressive block-busting in municipal areas
that straddle state borders.

The specter of large numbers of Blacks moving into

previously all-White neighborhoods at or near the state border might compel those
Whites who would prefer not to have Black neighbors to cross the border and move to
suburbs in the neighboring state.

Incorporating Existing Patterns of Migration and Population Growth

The ongoing return migration of Blacks to the South provides an excellent
jumping-off point from which to discuss the possibility of establishing a majority-Black
state through migration. This well-documented phenomenon has led to steady increases
in the Black populations of states which had experienced a decline in this population up
until the 1960s. The factors that are compelling many Blacks to undertake this migration
might be used to draw this migratory population to a specific state. It would also likely
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be easier to increase and focus an existing pattern of migration than it would be to create
an entirely new pattern.
Stack

(1996)

examines

the

ongoing

Southern

return

migration

from

an

anthropological perspective, noting that from about 1975, "the U.S. Bureau of the Census
released the first numbers suggesting that the exodus of black Americans from the
southern countryside to the cities of the North and West was turning back on itself.
Black Americans who had spent all or part of a lifetime in large industrial cities were
abandoning urban life and moving south, sometimes back to the homeplaces of their
childhood" (p. xiii). She adds that more recent Census figures confirm the Southward
migration, stating that by 1990 "the South had gained more than half a million black
Americans who were leaving the North-or more precisely, the South had regained from
the cities of the North the half-million black citizens it had lost to northward migration
during the 1960s.

The Census bureau now predicts that the southward trend will

continue" (p. xiv).
The effects of this Southern migration can clearly be seen in the tables on the
following four pages. The Table VII shows the population in each state as recorded in
the decennial Census from 1970, through 1980 and 1990, to 2000. The rate of increase
from 1990 to 2000 is also shown, and the states are ranked in order of this rate of
increase, from highest to lowest.

Table IX shows the Black proportion of the total

population in each state as recorded in the decennial Census from 1970, through 1980
and 1990, to 2000. Again, the rate of increase from 1990 to 2000 is also shown, and the
states are ranked in order of this rate of increase, from highest to lowest. It is important

to keep in mind that, because these numbers reflect proportional growth, they are
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tempered by their relationship to the growth of the non-Black population. This is clearly
reflected in the case of California, which was the seventh highest state in terms of actual
Black population growth, but was the only state to show a decrease in the Black
proportion of the total population, resulting from faster growth rates by other groups.
These tables show that both the highest occurrences of Black population growth
and the highest occurrences of growth of the Black proportion of the total population
have tended to occur in Southern states. Georgia is near the top of both tables, while
Maryland and Delaware both demonstrate phenomenal growth in the Black proportion.

Florida, Texas and North Carolina, like California, experienced immense Black
population growth that is not clearly reflected in the Black proportion because other
groups also grew significantly during this time.

This is particularly important in

consideration of the fact that enacting a settlement strategy may take a considerable
period of time-perhaps a decade or more-during which the rate of increase of the
Black population of the target state must outpace that of the White population.
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Table VIII.
Black population by decade from 1970 to 2000
ranked by rate of increase in Black population
from 1990 to 2000, from highest to lowest.
STATE
Florida
Georgia
Texas
New York

1970
1,042,000
1,187,000
1,399,000
2,169,000

1980
1,343,000
1,465,000
1,710,000
2,402,000

1990
1,759,534
1,746,565
2,021,632
2,859,055

2000
2,471,730
2,393,425
2,493,057
3,234,165

699,000

958,000

1,189,899

1,525,036

+335,137

North Carolina

1,126,000

1,319,000

1,456,323

1,776,283

+319,960

California

1,400,000

1,819,000

2,208,801

2,513,041

+304,240

Virginia
Illinois
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Michigan

861,000
1,426,000
970,000
1,017,000
991,000

1,009,000
1,675,000
1,077,000
1,047,000
1,199,000

1,162,994
1,694,273
1,154,826
1,089,795
1,291,706

1,441,207
1,937,671
1,372,501
1,289,123
1,474,613

+278,213
+243,398
+217,675
+199,328
+182,907

Tennessee
New Jersey
Louisiana

621,000
770,000
1,087,000

726,000
925,000
1,238,000

778,035
1,036,825
1,299,281

953,349
1,211,750
1,468,317

+175,314
+174,925
+169,036

Maryland

1990-2000
+712,196
+646,860
+471,425
+375,110

South Carolina

789,000

949,000

1,039,884

1,200,901

+161,017

Alabama

903,000

996,000

1,020,705

1,168,998

+148,293

Mississippi

816,000

887,000

915,057

1,041,708

+126,651

Minnesota
Missouri
Indiana
Massachusetts
Washington
Wisconsin
Arizona

35,000
480,000
357,000
176,000
71,000
128,000
53,000

53,000
514,000
415,000
221,000
106,000
183,000
75,000

94,944
548,208
432,092
300,130
149,801
244,539
110,524

202,972
655,377
538,015
398,479
238,398
326,506
185,599

Source: U.S. Census
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+108,028
+107,169
+105,923
+98,349
+88,597
+81,967
+75,075

Table VIII. (cont.)
Black population by decade from 1970 to 2000
ranked by rate of increase in Black population
from 1990 to 2000, from highest to lowest.
STATE
Nevada
Connecticut
Colorado
Arkansas

1970
28,000
181,000
66,000
352,000

1980
51,000
217,000
102,000
374,000

1990
78,771
274,269
133,146
373,912

2000
150,508
339,078
190,717
427,152

1990-2000
+71,737
+64,809
+57,571
+53,240

Oklahoma

172,000

205,000

233,801

284,766

+50,965

Kentucky
Delaware
Kansas

231,000
78,000
107,000

259,000
96,000
126,000

262,907
112,460
143,076

311,878
157,152
170,610

+48,971
+44,692
+27,534

Oregon

26,000

37,000

46,178

72,647

+26,469

Iowa

33,000

42,000

48,090

72,512

+24,422

Rhode Island
Nebraska

25,000
40,000

28,000
48,000

38,861
57,404

58,051
75,833

+19,190
+18,429

7,000

9,000

11,576

24,382

+12,806

20,000
67,000
8,000
3,000

24,000
65,000
17,000
4,000

30,210
56,295
27,195
7,198

42,412
62,817
33,343
12,218

+12,202
+6,522
+6,148
+5,020

Idaho

2,000

3,000

3,370

8,127

+4,757

Alaska

9,000

14,000

22,451

27,147

+4,696

Maine

3,000

3,000

5,138

9,553

+4,415

South Dakota
Vermont
Montana
North Dakota
Wyoming

2,000
1,000
2,000
2,000
3,000

2,000
1,000
2,000
3,000
3,000

3,258
1,951
2,381
3,524
3,606

6,687
4,492
4,441
5,372
4,863

+3,429
+2,541
+2,060
+1,848
+1,257

Utah

New Mexico
West Virginia
Hawaii
New Hampshire

Source: U.S. Census
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Table VIII.
Black proportion by decade from 1970 to 2000
ranked by rate of increase in Black proportion
from 1990 to 2000, from highest to lowest.
1970
17.823
14.234
25.861
29.854
0.920
15.348

1980
22.718
16.162
26.817
29.434
1.300
13.780

1990
24.886
16.882
26.961
30.789
2.170
13.600

2000
28.793
20.055
29.236
32.856
4.126
15.465

1990-2000
+3.908
+3.174
+2.276
+2.067
+1.956
+1.866

Rhode Island

2.640

2.957

3.873

5.538

+1.665

Connecticut
Virginia

5.970
18.524

6.982
18.870

8.344
18.796

9.957
20.360

+1.613
+1.564

Ohio

9.106

9.974

10.646

12.089

+1.443

Pennsylvania
Massachusetts

8.623
3.094

8.825
3.852

9.172
4.989

10.497
6.276

+1.325
+1.288

New York

11.893

13.680

15.892

17.043

+1.151

Wisconsin

2.897

3.889

4.999

6.087

+1.088

Mississippi
Indiana

36.806
6.873

35.184
7.559

35.561
7.794

36.620
8.848

+1.059
+1.055

Alabama

26.220

25.578

25.261

26.287

+1.025

Missouri
New Jersey
Nevada
Washington
Michigan
Oklahoma
Tennessee
Nebraska

10.263
10.742
5.726
2.083
11.166
6.721
15.826
2.697

10.454
12.559
6.375
2.565
12.945
6.777
15.814
3.057

10.713
13.413
6.554
3.078
13.896
7.433
15.953
3.637

11.713
14.401
7.532
4.045
14.837
8.253
16.757
4.431

+1.000
+.988
+.978
+.967
+.941
+.820
+.804
+.795

STATE
Maryland
Delaware
Georgia
Louisiana
Minnesota
Florida

Source: U.S. Census
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Table VIII. (cont.)
Black proportion by decade from 1970 to 2000,
ranked by rate of increase in Black proportion

from 1990 to 2000, from highest to lowest.

STATE

1970

1980

1990

2000

1990-2000

12.831
1.169
.302
2.993
7.176
4.762
1.243
.661

14.658
1.441
.267
2.759
7.075
5.330
1.405
.616

14.822
1.732
.107
3.015
7.134
5.775
1.625
.672

15.602
2.478
.749
3.617
7.716
6.346
2.123
1.092

+.780
+.746
+.642
+.602
+.582
+.571
+.499
+.420

.300

.289

.468

.886

Colorado
Vermont
New Hampshire

2.990
.225
.407

3.529
.196
.434

4.042
.347
.649

4.434
.738
.989

+.392
+.391
+.340

New Mexico

1.969

1.842

1.994

2.332

+.338

West Virginia

3.842

3.333

3.139

3.474

+.335

Hawaii
Idaho

1.040
.281

1.762
.318

2.454
.335

2.752
.628

+.298
+.293

.324

.459

.552

.836

+.285

3.000

3.483

4.082

4.330

+.248

.288
.904

.254
.638

.298
.795

.492
.985

+.194
+.190

30.452
22.157
18.305
12.494
7.016

30.397
22.424
16.360
12.018
7.685

29.824
21.970
15.906
11.901
7.422

29.933
22.068
15.978
11.956
7.419

+.108
+.097
+.072
+.055
-.003

Illinois
Iowa
Maine
Arizona
Kentucky
Kansas
Oregon
Utah

South Dakota

North Dakota

Alaska
Montana
Wyoming

South Carolina
North Carolina
Arkansas
Texas
California

Source: U.S. Census
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+.418

If the trends noted above in the proportional growth of the Black population
experienced from 1990 to 2000 were to continue indefinitely into the future, and if we
were to assume that the 'one drop' rule would continue to apply, then every state except

California could be projected to eventually have a Black majority. Maryland would be
the first to cross this threshold - in April of 2055; Louisiana, Georgia, and Delaware
would follow over the next thirty to forty years, followed by Mississippi in the beginning
of 2126. Restricting our analysis to those who identify as Black Only reduces the number
of states projected to eventually have a Black majority to 38, and extends the amount of
time anticipated to reach this threshold. Ironically, among the states that would never
reach a Black majority using Black Only numbers are those which currently contain some
of the highest Black Only populations-New York and Texas-along with the Southern
states of Arkansas, and North and South Carolina.
These projections differ from Census projections, which are derived from much
more sophisticated formulas that consider factors such as expected changes in childbirth
mortality rates and life expectancy. Census projections, which predict several possible
outcomes for periods ranging up to the next hundred years, do not anticipate the natural
development of a majority-Black state, although they do predict a continuous increase in
the Black proportion of almost all states. However, Census projections can not and do
not predict changes in migration patterns. It is, admittedly, unlikely in the extreme that
the same patterns of proportional population growth will continue for even a few years
into the future, much less decades. Nevertheless, the eventual development of a majorityBlack state without an intentional movement behind it is also a distinct possibility.
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Table X.
First ten states to reach a majority
of persons claiming any Black heritage

at 1990-2000 rate of growth.
State

Yrs.

Maryland
Louisiana

54.27
82.95

Georgia

91.24

Delaware
Mississippi
Florida
Virginia
Alabama
Minnesota
Connecticut

94.36
126.35
185.12
189.51
231.25
234.56
248.28

Table XI.
First ten states to reach a majority

of persons claiming only Black heritage
at 1990-2000 rate of growth.
State
Maryland
Louisiana
Georgia
Delaware
Mississippi

Yrs.
73.48
102.97
122.43
131.18
174.81

Alabama

328.15

Florida
Minnesota

349.26
352.15

Virginia
Ohio

359.39
472.45
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Table X indicates the top ten states which would be fastest to reach a majority of
persons claiming any Black heritage if current population trends were to continue, along
with the number of years this would take starting from the release of the 2000 Census;
these are also the only states for which this threshold would be surpassed within 250
years. Table XI indicates the top ten fastest states to reach a Black majority if current
population trends were to continue, along with the number of years this would take
starting from the release of the 2000 Census; these are also the only states for which this
threshold would be surpassed within half a millennium. In each case, the top five states
are the same, and are in the same order: Maryland, Louisiana, Georgia, Delaware, and
Mississippi.

All five are Southern states (although Maryland and Delaware are only

marginally so), which reflects both the existing high Black populations resulting from the
heritage of slavery, and the results of the current North-to-South migration pattern.
It should be noted that non-Hispanic Whites are, in fact, already in the minority in
three states-California, Hawaii, and New Mexico-although they remain the single
largest group in all of those states except Hawaii.

According to Meacham (2000),

"Florida and Texas will reach the same tipping point before the decade [2001-2010] is
out." Feagin and Sikes (1994) contend, however, that "the changing demographics, the
growing number of Americans with non-European roots, do not necessarily entail a
speedy shift of power to the underdog" (p. 334). This assessment has been borne out in
the past, particularly in the U.S. South, which has always been an important region to
Blacks, and to the fortunes of the nation as a whole.
Black and Black (1992) report that the present-day South "is the largest, the most
cohesive, and, arguably, the most important region in the United States in terms of
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establishing the partisan direction of presidential politics" (p. 344).

Their analysis

demonstrates how the South already has enormous electoral power, and this power will
only increase if we accept the accuracy of Census projections which indicate that over the
next quarter-century, "70 percent of population growth will take place in the South and
West, a continuation of a trend evident since the 1970s" (Morganthau, 1997).
Swain (1995), discussing multiple regression analysis of White members of
Congress rated on votes dealing with Black issues, states that "southerners from both
parties are less supportive of the whole range of issues... than are their colleagues from
other parts of the nation" (p. 16).

Hence, the settlement of a Southern state would not

only fall into the existing pattern of migration, but would also likely give Blacks the
opportunity to overturn the political orientation of that state in a way that would be
favorable to Black interests. The calculation of the political direction of the target state
must be part of the equation in making this determination.
The North to South migration pattern, along with the date regarding the recent
growth of Black proportions of the population, also suggests that states located along the
path from North to South could easily draw large increases in the Black proportions of
their populations. This is apparent in Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia, although the
latter has a very high differential that makes settlement an unreasonable option.
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An Examination of Specific States

It is tempting to point to many Western and Midwestern states with very low
populations resulting in very low differentials, such as Wyoming, North and South
Dakota, Montana, and even Alaska and Hawaii. However, several considerations must
be taken into account which might suggest that such states would be unsuitable for
settlement. First, these states currently have very low Black populations, and this is not
by accident. They are far removed from the traditional corridors of Black migration, and
a movement to settle one of these states would require participants to move much farther
from their points of origin, which would in turn encumber greater expense. Furthermore,
the lack of a sizable Black population would likely indicate a lack of the social resources-such as majority-Black churches, schools, social organizations, and business areaswhich would help Black immigrants adjust comfortably to living in a new state.
It is important to keep in mind that in a hypothetical state with an existing 25%
Black population, Black immigration sufficient to establish a bare majority would only
need to increase the overall population of the state by 50%. A state with less than 2%
Black population, on the other hand, would see its overall population nearly doubled by
the necessary Black immigration. The small overall populations of these states, some of
which cover a great deal of area, points to the lack of both physical infrastructure (roads,
houses, electrical power, etc.) and available jobs necessary to accommodate the massive
proportional population growth that would accompany settlement. The following table
demonstrates the percentage increase which each state would have to bear in order to
accommodate the settlement of a Black majority.
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Table XII.
Percentage increase in state population that would occur

in the process of achieving a Black majority* (assuming that
no Whites left the state), ranked from lowest to highest.
STATE

%

STATE

%

Mississippi
Louisiana
South Carolina
Georgia
Maryland
Alabama
North Carolina
Virginia
Delaware
New York
Tennessee
Arkansas
Illinois
Florida
Michigan
New Jersey

26.760%
34.288%
40.135%
41.527%
42.413%
47.427%
55.865%
59.279%
59.890%
65.914%
66.486%
68.044%
68.796%
69.069%
70.325%
71.198%

California
Kansas
Massachusetts
Wisconsin
Rhode Island
Colorado
Nebraska
Alaska
Minnesota
Washington
Arizona
West Virginia
Hawaii
Iowa
New Mexico
Oregon

85.161%
87.308%
87.448%
87.825%
88.925%
91.132%
91.137%
91.340%
91.748%
91.911%
92.765%
93.053%
94.496%
95.044%
95.337%
95.753%

Ohio

75.822%

Utah

97.816%

Texas
Missouri
Pennsylvania
Connecticut
Indiana

76.088%
76.574%
79.006%
80.087%
82.304%

New Hampshire
Wyoming
South Dakota
North Dakota
Maine

98.023%
98.030%
98.228%
98.327%
98.501%

Oklahoma

83.495%

Vermont

98.524%

Kentucky
Nevada

84.567%
84.936%

Idaho
Montana

98.744%
99.016%

*This calculation assumes that a Black majority could be achieved in a sufficiently short
period of time to avoid the additional effects of ongoing natural population growth.
Source: U.S. Census
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States with very large existing populations may be better suited to absorb a large
immigration and control of such states would provide immense political power.
However, large states generally have such high differentials that settlement is simply
impossible, even where large Black populations are already present in these states. The
largest states, California, Texas, New York, and Florida, obviously suffer from this
drawback, and Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, and Massachusetts would not fare
much better.

Three models highlight the approaches that the Black community might take in
choosing a state for settlement.

The first, Delaware, has the lowest differential, and

would thus be the easiest to settle.

The second, Mississippi, is of great symbolic

significance and would represent a complete political reversal in favor of Black interests.
The third, Georgia, would be very difficult to accomplish, but would yield immense
political power through the control of a large number of congressional seats and electoral
votes.

The particular strengths and weaknesses of each state are discussed in the

following sections.

Delaware

With a significant Black proportion of its already low overall population,
Delaware has the lowest differential of any state in the Union.

It has an overall

population of 783,600 and a Black population of over 150,000, which means that the
addition of fewer than 470,000 Blacks would suffice to tip the balance of population.
Therefore, fewer than thirteen out of every thousand Blacks currently living outside of
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Delaware would have to move there to establish a majority of all residents. Delaware is
well situated to accommodate a migration, as it falls directly between heavily Black areas
of both the Northern and Southern states.

It is in particularly close proximity to

Philadelphia, which has over 672,000 Black residents, and Baltimore, which has over
424,000 Black residents; and it is only a few hours of driving out of New York City,
which has over 2,274,000 Black residents.
Delaware is also fortuitously close to the center of American government in
Washington D.C., and has business-friendly laws which have drawn many corporations
to locate their headquarters there. Barone et al. (2001) note that "Delaware has... thrived
in finance. In the late

1 9 th

Century, it pioneered liberal laws of incorporation, giving

more flexibility and power to managers and owners. A large share of the nation's big
companies are incorporated in Delaware" (p. 345).

Therefore, in addition to the

previously discussed political benefits of state control, majority control of Delaware
would give the Black leadership of the state access to some of the farthest-reaching
boardrooms in America.
Delaware has only one member of the House of Representatives, and thus holds
only three electoral votes. It is, as Barone et al (2001) note, already a fairly liberal state.
They remark that "in the 1990s Delaware, like so many of America's largest metro areas,
trended towards the Democrats, and now Democrats hold both the governorship and both
Senate seats" (pp. 345-7). Senior Senator Joe Biden, consistently ranks among the most
liberal in various organization surveys. From 1997 to 2000, Biden voted in support of the
positions advocated by the Civil Rights Action Center, which is particularly concerned
with issues of racial justice, 31 out of 36 times. It is possible, but unlikely, that the influx
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of population necessary to establish a Black majority in Delaware would sufficiently
increase the population to merit a second Representative.
Only two other states offer differentials close to that of Delaware without being
geographically remote. These are Vermont, with a differential of just under 600,000; and
Rhode Island, with a differential of over 932,000.

Neither is as well situated as

Delaware, nor does either have a significant Black population.

Vermont, in fact,

currently has the lowest Black proportion in the country except for Idaho and Montana.
Other states with reasonably low differentials that share the geographic advantages
enjoyed by Delaware include West Virginia, Virginia, and Maryland. West Virginia has
a differential of 1,682,710. Maryland has a much higher differential of 2,246,414, but
has the unique advantage of being the state with the fastest-growing Black proportion.
Maryland also has enough congressional seats and electoral votes to make its settlement a
source of considerable political power beyond the capture of senate seats and a
governor's mansion. Virginia has an overwhelming differential of well over four million.

Mississippi

Mississippi has the highest Black proportion of any state in the country, with
over 36 percent of the population identifying as such. With a long history of particularly
brutal slavery and segregation, Mississippi would probably present the greatest symbolic
victory. The settlement of Mississippi would also overturn the particularly conservative
nature of the state.

Currently, both Senators from Mississippi are particularly

conservative Republicans, and Barone et al. (2001) state: "Politically, Mississippi is a
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conservative state, carried by Republicans in the last six presidential elections" (p.855).
For exactly these reasons, however, Mississippi would also be the state where Whites
would most vigorously oppose the development of a Black majority. Mississippi has four
members of the House of Representatives, and a settlement sufficient to establish a Black
voting majority would increase the state population sufficiently to earn a fifth, and
possibly a sixth. This gain might be offset by the emigration of Whites unwilling to live
under a Black government.

The differential is 761,242, but this does not take into

account the disenfranchisement of over 145,000 Blacks for felony convictions, including
125,000 who have served their sentences.
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Alabama are similarly situated in terms of their
size and political history, with Alabama being the most conservative of the three. All of
their differentials are much higher than Mississippi's, coming in around 1.5 million, 1.6
million, and 2.1 million, respectively.

Georgia

With a voting differential of close to 3.64 million people, this state would seem
to be an unlikely candidate for settlement. However, there are some factors which point
towards control of Georgia as the best reasonable outcome for Blacks. Barone et al.
(2001) note that Georgia has come to international prominence as "Atlanta, long a
regional capital, has become a world city" (p. 426). The fifteen electoral votes held by
this state give it critical power in presidential elections, and a respectable delegation of
thirteen members in the House of Representatives.
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The congressional delegation, and

consequently the electoral vote count, would probably increase by five or six with the
necessarily large migration into the state. A Black majority in the state legislature could
craft three or four overwhelmingly White districts in which to pack the bulk of White
areas, creating serviceable Black majorities in as many as fifteen districts. Such an effort
would essentially posit a reversal of the current situation, where there are only two Black
representatives despite the fact that close to 29% of the population is Black.
A more important factor might be the status of the existing Black population of
Georgia, which includes a sizable middle class centered in Atlanta.
The increase of Georgia's Black population in the 1990s was over 646,000,
second in the nation to that of Florida. This was more than 5 times the numerical
increase experienced by Mississippi, and almost 15 times as much as Delaware's.
Roughly ten percent of all Blacks currently living outside of Georgia would have to move
there to establish a majority, but more than half of the Black population of the United
States is already within two-hundred miles of Georgia's borders, including all of
Alabama and Mississippi, North and South Carolina, Eastern parts of Louisiana and
Arkansas, and the Northern half of Florida.
Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia are all large enough to provide a similar
political boon if they were successfully settled, but all three have higher differentials than
Georgia (with North Carolina's approaching 4.5 million), and none have as much
congressional or electoral clout. Maryland has already been discussed in the context of
its political value, as well as its reasonably moderate differential and fast natural growth
of the Black proportion.
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CHAPTER IV.
Potential Repercussions

The development of majority-Black state, and the accompanying transition from a
White governing regime to a Black governing regime, would have profoundly impact
residents of that state.

Similar transitions in both urban and rural counties and

municipalities have resulted in political strife, as the incoming majority group struggles
to assert control while the outgoing majority group seeks to maintain the power to which
it is accustomed. These transitions follow familiar patterns based largely on the social
preferences and ideological tendencies of the local White population. In every case to
date, however, the assumption of Black majority control in an area has occurred under the
auspices of a state that remains majority-White in its overall population. Succession to a
Black governed state provides much previously uncharted territory, as a state is possessed
of vastly more power over which groups with differing goals might contend.
The effects of success in such a venture would resonate throughout the country,
because Blacks would directly control the election of two senators and the allocation of at
least a small number of electoral votes. It is possible, but unlikely for various reasons,
that such success could result in changes to the nature of the political orientation
generally expressed by Blacks.

What is more likely is that Blacks, having solidly

asserted majority control over the state in question, would then have to contend with the
same internal rifts over personality differences and policy distinctions that now defines
much of White state politics. At the same time, the unique character of a majority-Black
state would subject its government to the additional pressure of exceptional scrutiny.
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Relations Between a Black Majority and a White Minority

The likely consequences of success in an effort to establish a Black majority state
can be forecast to a degree by examining the results of Black succession at the county and
municipal levels.

Historically, in municipalities where Blacks become a significant

proportion of the population, significant numbers of Whites tend to move, either to
suburbs on the outskirts of the municipality, or to highly segregated and sheltered areas
within the municipality. Whites are not so likely, however, to pick up stakes and move to
another state or region entirely, as many will still have ties to the city, either through their
employment, or through property or business investments in the area.

Even when it

becomes clear that Blacks will succeed to majority status, Whites can still count on
appeals to powers outside the municipality to see to their political needs. Some Whites
would, however, move to other states, particularly those who either disliked the very idea
of living under a majority-Black governing regime, or who were apprehensive about the
kinds of policies that would be pursued by such a regime.
Even though a massive White exodus would not be an expected outcome, it is
likely that fewer Whites would be willing into migrate into a majority-Black state.
However, a state is a far cry from a suburb, and even a small state would offer plentiful
opportunities for Whites who wish to live among other Whites, in a town or city with a
majority-White local government. A majority-Black state, however, would not provide
opportunities for Whites to live under a majority-White state government. Whites who
did choose to move to a majority-Black state would therefore be those who were
undeterred by the idea of living under majority-Black governance.
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The GSS data

discussed in Chapter 4 tends to support the contention that some Blacks would likely
migrate in order to live in a majority-Black state on the assumption that the policies
enacted by a majority-Black government would benefit Black residents. It is also likely
that Black population growth through new births would generally continue to outpace
White population growth through new births, as is projected by the U.S. Census. These
factors point to the likelihood that once the Black population was to achieve a majority
within a state, Blacks would remain in the majority in that state.
Those Whites who would leave a state because they are unwilling to live under a
Black government or the policies they expect of such a government are likely to be
among the most conservative members of the group. Their departure is liable to have the
effect of making the target state more liberal in the nature of the Whites who remain, and
may tend to make the surrounding states decidedly more conservative, especially if
Whites are moving into the same states from which a large number of Blacks have
recently emigrated. This result would probably be most profound in a very conservative
state with a history of racial conflict, like Mississippi or Alabama. Given the very large
number of Blacks that would have to move into a larger state like Georgia, Virginia, or
North Carolina to establish a majority, a movement focused on such a state would also
likely reduce Black populations in neighboring states enough to have a significant
impact. In states like Delaware and Rhode Island, however, which are both very small
and more liberal in the views generally expressed by their White residents, a smaller
proportion of Whites would be likely to emigrate. At the same time, the low overall
population of these states would minimize the impact that the transition to a Black
majority would have on the racial balance of state populations elsewhere.
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The relationship between a Black population moving towards majority status and
the White population moving towards becoming the minority within a state would likely
parallel the relations between similarly situated groups in counties, municipalities and in
congressional districts. The nature of such a relationship would depend to some degree
on the history of relations in the geographic area under consideration.

As has been

previously noted, when Blacks became a significant proportion of the population in
Northern cities, the tendency of the existing White political organizations was to bring
some Blacks into their power structure, although Black representation in these
organizations may have been far more symbolic than substantive.

In Southern cities,

where the stigma of interracial relations has carried much greater force since the time of
slavery, the tendency was disenfranchisement of Black voters, manipulation of political
boundaries to minimize even symbolic Black representation, and disempowerment of
Black elected officials to minimize substantive representation.
Even in the South, however, this has not always been the case, particularly in
recent decades when it has become increasingly difficult to support the ends of racism
through any means.

Through coalition politics, a significantly increasing Black

proportion of the population in a state might first have a moderating effect on the politics
of White statewide officials before leading to ascendance of Black officials in those
positions. Perry (1997) states: "Like blacks in Birmingham, a growing number of black
voters in New Orleans in coalition with middle-class whites played an increasingly
important role in the election of the city's first racially moderate white mayor, first
racially liberal white mayor, and first black mayor" (p. 183). Neither does a growing
Black population mean that Black residents will immediately abandon liberal Whites in
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circumstances where Black support for a Black candidate might take enough votes from a
liberal White candidate to hand an election to a conservative White candidate. Keiser
(1997) notes that in Philadelphia's 1979 mayoral race, Blacks split their votes between
Black candidate Lucien Blackwell and White liberal Bill Green, giving Green enough
support to defeat the White conservative candidate, David Marston.

He states that

because of "the history of mutually advantageous cooperation and coalition formation
between middle-class white liberals and blacks, lining up behind Green was not
perceived by blacks as 'selling out.'

Rather, it yielded a black managing director, and

brought blacks one step closer to the mayor's office" (p. 74).
However, once a solid Black majority has been reached, it is likely that Black
support for non-Black candidates would dwindle in favor of support for Black candidates.
Swain (1995) describes how "White politicians, regardless of how well they have
represented their black constituents and no matter how long their tenure, have found
themselves under increasing pressure to step aside whenever their political units have
been redrawn to have black majorities or when demographic change has altered their
district's racial majority" (p. 170).

Lavender (1994) discusses how voter turnout

decreases among Whites living in cities or districts that become minority-majority areas.
In such cases, he explains, White voters are less likely to vote when they only have
minority candidates to choose from.
Such a shift, however, does not mean that Whites would entirely lose their
influence in the election of public officials.

White political influence will be less

apparent than in a majority-White state, but several factors will allow Whites to continue
to influence the election of candidates of their preference, and the policies endorsed by
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those who are elected.

Canon (1999) points this out in his discussion of the majority-

Black congressional districts created following the 1990 Census. He states that "though
it was unlikely that whites would win in the new black majority districts, the diversity of
black candidates running in 1992 placed white voters in a potentially pivotal position in
terms of deciding the type of candidate who won. A relatively cohesive minority can
usually help elect their preferred candidate when the majority is divided" (p. 96).
Similarly, Whelan and Young (1991) note that the "results of the 1986 mayoral election
[of New Orleans] suggest that the white vote played the same role that the black vote
played [as a swing-vote] in the 1960s and 1970s, when it was the minority component of
the electorate" (p. 141).
A dramatic example of the effects of an ethnic succession from a White
governing regime to a Black governing regime occurred much more recently, in Gadsden
County, Florida. Although Gadsden County has had a majority of Black residents for
decades, Whites "held a vise grip on Gadsden politics until the mid-1990s" (Steinback,
2002). It is only in the past few years that this Black majority in the population has
translated to Black control of the local government. Steinback (2002) writes that "three
years ago, Gadsden County nearly erupted during a tense, bitter transition to black
political power that swept away virtually every white administrator in Quincy in favor of
a largely untested phalanx of black replacements." Whites were concerned that the Black
governing regime would use it power to exact revenge for a previous era of "virtual
apartheid" in the region, where Whites were reportedly unresponsive to Black concerns,
and "difficulties thus have fallen disproportionally on its black residents."

In 1998,

Steinback (2002) reports "the commission majority began to assert itself -- seemingly
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confirming the fears of white residents" of Black reprisals, when the "city manager and
city attorney, both white, were fired. The police and fire chiefs, both white, resigned. All
their replacements were black."
However, despite this tumultuous start, several years into the existence of the
Black governing regime, Whites have become reassured that Blacks are not seeking
revenge. Steinback (2002) asserts that "Gadsden's rising black leaders" are now seeking
to "set right the disparities wrought by generations of white minority leadership -without alienating today's white residents." The continuing political reprisals feared by
Whites have not occurred, and the governing regime has instead focused on making
improvements "all around the city" and not just in Black areas. "In a county where both
white and black residents have deep roots," Steinback (2002) concludes, "making
progress has triumphed over getting even."
Black candidates running for office in an area with a majority-Black political
constituency and a large white minority-whether this area is a city, a county, a
congressional district, or a state-must take into account the concerns of White voters,
and must address these concerns in their campaigns in order to succeed. This is borne out
by Bullock's (1984) assessment that "Black politicians often face the choice of either
making biracial appeals in hopes of winning white support or criticizing inequities and
promising correctives thereby attracting more votes... Even in Atlanta, with its sizable
black majority, blacks unacceptable to whites have difficulty getting elected" (p. 249).
Swain (1995) explains that the Black proportion of a majority-Black district
dictates the degree to which Black elected officials must appeal to their White
constituents. She states that districts which have historically elected Blacks "seem to be
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the least constraining for black representatives.

In most of these districts, large black

populations mean that white voters are essentially irrelevant to the election process. The
representative alone decides whether or not he or she will represent the district's white
minority" (p. 47). Canon (1999) suggests that representatives from such districts will be

handicapped in their ability to serve their constituents because "Black representatives
who campaigned primarily in the African-American community and see themselves as
representing black interests will be less likely to serve in the leadership... and more likely
to speak in the language of the politics of difference, focus on racial issues in legislation
and committee preferences, and focus their constituency service efforts in the black

community" (p. 145).
In recently created majority-Black districts, however, the balance of the
population is significantly different, leading Swain (1995) to note that none of these
recently created districts "has a black population large enough for the representative to
have much of a choice about whether to appeal to white voters: because whites are the
swing voters in each of these districts, they are courted assiduously" (p. 74). Whelan and
Young (1991)

discuss how the concern of Black politicians seeking White votes

influences policy decisions. They state that "conservative white homeowners no longer
dominate the city [of Atlanta] and its spending patterns. On the other hand, even a black
leadership is reluctant to raise taxes for purposes of redistribution" (p. 146).

Canon

(1999) also remarks that "careful assessment of the nature of representation in these
[majority-Black] districts shows that most black members of the U.S. House of
Representatives represent their entire district, not just the African-American voters" (xii).
Expanding upon this view, he states that "black representatives in Congress operate on a
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continuum of racial representation. The most avid supporters of black interests, such as
John Conyers and William Clay, also spend a substantial proportion of their legislative
work on issues that are important for all Americans. Likewise, the members of the CBC
who are most sensitive to the interests of their white constituents spend substantial
amounts of time on black interests" (p. 9). His overall assessment is that the "race of the
representative has important implicationsfor the type of representation that is provided
to a district with a significant number of black constituents. Black members do a better

job of walking the racial tightrope and balancing the distinctive needs of black voters and
the general interests of all voters, black and white alike. White members tend to have a
more exclusive focus on nonracial issues" (pp. 244-5; italics are author's own).
Just as majority-Black cities and counties must contend with the fact that they are
located in majority-White states, a majority-Black state would have to contend with the
fact that it is located in a majority-White country. As Canon (1999) explains, "White
representatives from districts that are 30-40 percent black can largely ignore their black
constituents, and many do. Black representatives from districts that are 30-40 percent
white cannot ignore their white constituents because they are operating in an institution
that is about 86 percent white and a nation that is 82.5 percent white" (p.13). Even when
it becomes clear that Blacks will succeed to majority status, Whites can still count on
appeals to powers outside the municipality to see to their political needs.
Another factor that would likely fall in favor of White participation in the political
process is institutional wealth. Even in a majority-Black state, Whites will tend to have
more institutional wealth due to their historic circumstances.

Therefore, White wealth

and power will certainly impact which Black candidates are able to succeed, particularly
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for the more powerful offices, such as the Senators and Governor, in which Whites have

a higher stake. Thomas and Savitch (1991) suggest that White business interests would
have little difficulty aligning with a Black government, if that will help White businesses
to succeed financially.

He notes that in previous decades, "business groups often

obtained their electoral majorities by joining with the white middle class. Today, it is not
uncommon for business to form alliances with black constituencies, as occurred in

Atlanta and Detroit" (p.12). Fleischmann (1991) also examines this issue as it affected
Atlanta, and his conclusion is this:
Black electoral clout... has allowed control of City Hall to pass from
white businessmen to a generation of black politicians who matured
during the civil rights movement. White business leaders did not respond
by abandoning Atlanta. Rather, they forged a new governing coalition

with black mayors and City Council members. This transition was far
from smooth, and while it did leave some lasting changes in the local
policy agenda, the new regime also maintained the commitment of
economic and political elites to promoting growth. (p. 105).

While some Whites may initially be leery of Black governance, evidence from
majority-Black congressional districts and municipalities indicates that White concerns
may be allayed once they become used to living under a Black governing regime. Canon
(1999) states: "Theorists and politicians alike were quoted... as arguing that having a
black representative can change the preferences of white voters who recognize that their
interests can be represented by a black politician.

Anecdotal evidence to support this

point is plentiful" (p. 51). Grofman et al. (1992) also express this contention, stating that
the "best evidence suggests relative constancy of polarization in elections in majority-

white districts in the deep South... and diminished polarization on the part of whites in
majority-black areas as voters accept the fact that the winner will be black and as they
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experience the reality that black elected officials are not as undesirable as they might
have previously feared" (p. 132).
The issue of redistricting within a majority-Black state raises some interesting
legal questions. In particular, the question might be raised as to whether or not a

majority-Black state with a sizable White population would be required to create any
majority-White districts at all. The elements of the Voting Rights Act which deal with
redistricting have been interpreted towards protecting minority groups from being
disenfranchised by the machinations of the majority. However, because the standards

applied to this protection require that the minority group consistently votes as a bloc, and
in doing so are unable to elect the candidate of their choice, it remains to be seen as to
whether or not Whites would be considered a minority in need of protection in a state
where another group constituted a majority of the population. As Carol Swain notes,
"thus far, the Supreme Court has not been sympathetic to the pleas of white voters who
complain about racial gerrymanders that crack and stack their populations in order to
make way for minority districts" (p. 200). Black leaders responsible for crafting districts
in a majority-Black state could effectively skirt this question and preempt the issue of
White representation by creating a sufficient number of majority-White districts to
accommodate the White population and satisfy potential burdens that might be imposed
by the Voting Rights Act.
Through

careful

designation

of boundaries,

however, the

majority-Black

legislature could aid their own cause in a number of ways, by employing the same

cracking, stacking and packing techniques that have previously been used to dilute Black
voting power.

First, they could 'pack' a single overwhelmingly White district, thus
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reducing the influence of White voters in all remaining Black districts. Second, they
could isolate wealthier suburban Whites, who may tend to be least sympathetic to Black
interests, by 'stacking' them in districts with a sizable Black majority, thus ensuring that

any White districts would have a majority of liberal Whites who were more sympathetic
to Black issues. Even if the Voting Rights Act were to be interpreted as requiring the
creation of a majority-White district, it could not necessitate that such a district be
constructed to the benefit of candidates of a particular ideology.

Potential Effects on Party Loyalty and Affiliation

Black loyalty to the Democratic Party is longstanding and well documented.
Barker et al. (1995) state that, because of "major differences between the parties on civil
rights and racial issues... the vast majority of blacks became Democrats" (p. 222). Feagin
and Sikes (1994) also note that since the 1960s "the Republican Party's stance on civil
rights issues has been perceived by a majority of African Americans as retrogressive and
inimical to black interests.

The historical evidence, though not yet compiled in a

systematic way, seems supportive of their view" (p. 325). GSS data also supports this
understanding of Black party loyalty.

One GSS question asks, "Which party, the

Republican or the Democratic, do you feel will do more to help blacks in the next few
years, or do you think there isn't much difference between the two?"

Of 486 Black

respondents, 69.1% indicated that they felt the Democratic Party would do more to help
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Blacks, while a mere 1.6% felt that the Republican Party would do more, and only 29.2%
felt that there was not much difference.

As a result of these factors, it is easy to understand why Blacks have given such
overwhelming support to the Democratic Party since the 1960s, generally voting for

Democratic candidates at both the state and federal levels. Frymer (1999) argues that this
consistent loyalty has actually done more harm than good to Blacks seeking substantive
representation. He asserts that throughout history, "the desire of political parties to elect
candidates to national office has meant marginalization for African Americans" (p. 6).
He further claims that "contrary to the beliefs of those who argue that the mere presence
of liberal African Americans is sufficient for pushing parties closer to their interests (and
thereby for representing their interests), rational party actors will try to move their
organization farther to the right on the political spectrum" (p. 25), concluding that the
"Democratic party and its strategists focus almost exclusively on swing voters (among
those considered likely to vote) who lie in between the parties. In the effort to attract
swing voters , they all but ignore captured voters" (p. 127).
The strength of Black loyalty to the Democratic Party, and the apparent disinterest
of the Republican Party both point to the probability that Blacks in a majority-Black state
will retain their support for the Democratic Party.

This analysis is supported by the

experience of majority Black municipalities and congressional districts. In every case,
majority-Black congressional districts have elected Democrats to the Congress. In fact,
the only two Black Republicans elected to the House of Representatives in the past halfcentury have both come from congressional districts that were overwhelmingly White.
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Frymer (1999) also notes that, despite the success of majority-minority districts in
securing minority representation in the House of Representatives, "the national majority
on various legislative matters is still centered around white voters, and majorities can be
found without the need to appeal to congressional members representing majority-black
districts" (p. 198). This analysis suggests that even an entire state could be marginalized
in its impact on the nation, if the voting majorities can be secured in Congress and in the

Senate without the support of that state's representatives. However, given the significant
power accorded to members of the Senate, the presence of Black senators will make it
much less likely that members of that body-including Republicans, but particularly
Democrats-will continuously seek to pass initiatives without garnering the support of

the Black members of that body. Furthermore, the successful enactment of Democratic
policies in a majority-Black state would benefit the Democratic Party nationally,
enhancing the value of such a state to the party, thus encouraging support by the party for
the success of policies enacted in that state.
Frymer (1999), however, cautions that Blacks may not necessarily succeed in
having their concerns met merely by reliance on the existing political system. "As long
as the median voter in the United States maintains ambivalent-to-conservative views
toward African American political interests," he cautions, "the two-party system will fail
to represent all interests democratically. For black interests to be addressed seriously by
the party system, either black political leaders must reshape national public opinion or we
must devise an electoral system that provides incentives for parties to appeal to black
voters and win elections at the same time" (p. 48).
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Potential Internal Leadership Conflicts

The development of a politically unassailable Black majority hardly ensures the
end of all political strife within a state. Instead, the competition for power is likely to
become internalized within the Black community.

For example, Barker et al. (1995)

describe the aftermath of the consolidation of Black power through their majority status

in Greene County Alabama, beginning in the mid 1980s. They report that "in the absence
of a white challenge, the unity that characterized earlier black political efforts quickly
dissipated and competing black factions soon surfaced.

By 1997 black factions were

accusing each other of voter fraud and other political and moral indiscretions" (p. 82). It
is interesting as an historical aside to observe that even Blacks in Reconstruction-era
legislatures were not necessarily monolithic in their politics. Vincent (1976) describes
how personality disputes and political disharmony resulted in Blacks from different
factions of the Republican Party throwing their support behind different White
gubernatorial candidates. In this case, political circumstances "soon disclosed that blacks
were far from united... the struggle for political supremacy found blacks on both sides"
(p. 135).
Canon (1999), however, does note that although "black interests, and the political
expression of those interests, are by no means monolithic, they are far more cohesive than
those of any other racial or ethnic minority in the United States. African Americans vote
more cohesively and demonstrate more consistent political opinions (on racial and partracial issues) than Hispanics, Asian Americans, Jews, or other racial or ethnic groups"
(pp. 32-33).

132

Where Blacks are in the majority, Black elected officials tend to come from the
Black elite-the wealthiest and most educated segments of the Black community-which

directly parallels the White political experience.

Frymer (1999) notes: "Scholars have

pointed to diversity among African Americans-for instance, a growing middle class and
occupational, intellectual, and cultural heterogeneity-and they claim that the more
important determinant of individual identity among African Americans is economic
background" (p. 146). Stone and Pierannunzi (1997) state somewhat more dramatically

that there exists "a fault line within the African-American community between haves and
have-nots, but its reflection in electoral politics is quite weak" (p. 167). The key result of
this disparity, they assert, "is the low level of voter participation, especially among the
younger generation of African Americans.

Atlanta's urban regime is therefore built

around accommodations principally between the black middle class and white business
elites" (p. 167). Perry (1997) also notes this sentiment, stating:
An increasing criticism of black politics is that the benefits produced by
increasing black political incorporation have gone to members of the black
middle class who possessed the educational, occupational, and social skills
necessary to take advantage of the new opportunities... The irony is that
the increased black political participation and influence in cities in the
1970s and 1980s is in large part a result of the entry of a significantly
larger proportion of the black lower class into electoral politics, and their
political awakening was often stimulated by the prospecting of electing a
viable black candidate to a high-level political office. (p. 189).

Divisions within the Black community could also develop around issues beyond
class structure. Orr (1997) notes, for example, that in Baltimore in the 1970s, "the most
important ideological division was between machine-style black politicians and those
black leaders whose roots were in the civil rights movement" (p. 205).
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It is also

important to note that Blacks who would be willing to move to a different state for the

specific purpose of securing greater political power would probably be more politically
active than the typical Black population, and it is certainly possible that the participants

in such a migration would include some Blacks with Nationalist or Separatist views. At
the same time, however, a majority-Black state without the onus of White government

impeding the ability of Blacks to address issues as they wish, would likely serve as a
catalyst for more open expression of conservative Black points of view. In other words,

the entire spectrum of Black political thought, from the most radical ideas to the most
conservative, would likely be freely expressed within a state where a majority-Black
governing regime was solidified.

Pressures of Governing Under the National Microscope

One unique problem that is likely to face the government of a majority-Black
state is the likelihood that this government will face exceptional scrutiny.

Some will

hope that a majority-Black government proves capable of handling the typical problems
associated with the management of a state flawlessly and gracefully; others will expect it
to fail dramatically.

Concern about the expectation of failure is conveyed by Florida

State Representative Curtis Richardson, who represents an area which includes Gadsden
County.

Richardson fears that "people look at them and say, 'Black folks running

things,' and automatically assume there will be chaos" (Steinback, 2002).
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Stone and Pierannunzi (1997) describe a particular situation in which the attention
focused on majority-Black governance created difficulties for the governing regime:

In Atlanta in the 1970s, the situation was further complicated by the high
expectations surrounding black control of the school system.
To
acknowledge publicly that low academic achievement was not amenable
to the quick fix of a change in the racial control of school administration
would be risky; administrators might be seen as admitting failure. As it
turned out, not acknowledging the problem and instead promoting "an
aura of success" carried an even greater hazard-that of breeding cynicism
and opportunism within the school system. (p. 173).

The example of the Atlanta school system highlights the simple fact that the most
likely outcome is that a majority-Black state government will face the same challenges,
successes, and failures that every state government deals with regularly.

While every

government must contend with some policy failures and some degree of corruption
among government officials, a majority-Black government would undoubtedly wish to
avoid these pitfalls for fear that Whites who were ideologically opposed to Black aims
would latch onto them as justification for the maintenance of discriminatory policies.

Inevitably, some failures will occur and some corruption will be unearthed, leading to the
feared outcome. However, greater problems would inevitably arise from efforts to cover
up problems in order to avoid the stigma associated with the experience of typical
governmental problems.

135

The Effect on the Nation as a Whole

The existence of a majority-Black state would necessarily affect the politics of the
entire nation.

To begin with, the permanent presence of two Black-elected Senators

would give Blacks clout in that body which could not be ignored, even if the support of
Black senators could be bypassed on some issues (as can the support of any individual
White Senator). But the more profound effect would be in the presentation of the Black
leaders of a majority-Black state as role models for the Black population, and as
examples of Blacks exercising a high level of political power to the White population.
Perry (1997) states that "the election of blacks to high positions of public responsibility
not only benefits blacks generally by improving their individual and group self-esteem
but also makes it easier for whites to accept blacks in other positions of public
responsibility. Thus, the benefits that blacks have achieved in the symbolic realm have
substantially improved their social status" (p. 196). Clayton (2000) notes the comparable
opportunity that majority-minority districts present, stating that the "creation of majorityminority districts is a practical but temporary solution to a complex problem....Majority
black districts can serve as a staging grounds for blacks entering the political arena. By
creating majority-minority districts, blacks and other minorities can show the majority
that they have the ability and integrity to represent all Americans" (p. 129).
Despite the power that would be inherent in the control of a state, the Black polity
would have to be prepared to deal with the necessary relationship between political
power and business and economic forces.

Control of a state would give the Black

population therein the opportunity to experiment with different policy approaches, but the
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stark reality of the need to raise revenues and make hard decisions on their expenditure

would likely end up having a moderating effect on the desire for immediate and complete
social and economic change.

Lusane (1994) asserts that "economic development and

power in the United States, as well as the distribution of social and cultural norms, is
rooted in political power and public policy" (p. 39).

Stone and Pierannunzi (1997),

however, note that "Governance comes out of the interplay between electoral and

economic power.

Neither stands alone.

Governance...

requires cooperation and

accommodation among a network of institutions, especially political and economic ones"
(p. 166; italics are author's own). Orr (1997) agrees with the latter sentiment, stating that
"electoral

control alone does not secure

inclusion in the mainstream

economy.

Something more is needed. Black urban regimes must establish strong links with massbased

political/civic

organizations,

business

leaders,

nonprofits,

and

other

nongovernmental institutions" (p. 217).
Perry (1997),

discussing majority-Black municipal advances, sums up the

ultimate hopes of this strategy:
The benefits that blacks have received from their increased political power
Increased black
and ... have been both symbolic and substantive...
political participation and especially increased black officeholding have
moved the black populace towards enhanced group social standing, which
concomitantly has elevated black's self-esteem. A derivative of the
symbolic benefits that ensue from blacks holding important governmental
positions is that it becomes easier for other blacks to move into important
positions of public responsibility. (p. 195).
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CHAPTER V.
Conclusions

The superior political status of Whites combined with disenfranchisement which
Blacks experienced prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prevented

geographic relocation from succeeding as a strategy for Black political empowerment.
Present day social conditions are far more conducive to the success of such a venture, and
an examination of the migration that would need to be undertaken reveals that a

settlement strategy is logistically possible in several states. The most likely state for
success would be Delaware, based on the relatively small number of Blacks who would
have to move to that state combined with a convenient location relative to the traditional

corridors of migration and several Northern cities with large Black populations.
Having two Senators elected by Blacks would provide the Black community with
substantively and symbolically powerful issue advocacy and voting power within the
Senate, which is organized in a way that provides its members with more relative power
than Representatives enjoy in the House. A majority-Black state government would also
control redistricting, election procedures, and felony disenfranchisement laws, and would
have the power to enact policies generally preferred by the Black community. These
additional resources under the control of a Black population would likely enhance the
influence of Blacks within the Democratic Party. Perhaps the greatest value, however, of
the presence of a Black Senator or Governor is simply the symbolic message that Blacks
are capable of holding such offices; that they are intelligent enough, talented enough,
good enough to sit at the table of power now dominated by Whites.
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There are many avenues for further research that could be conducted regarding
this concept.

A much more detailed analysis might seek to determine which locations

Blacks should move away from, in order to salvage electoral potential that is currently
being wasted. It would make political sense for Blacks to leave those areas where Black

votes are routinely over-ridden by White votes for candidates generally opposed by Black
voters. More concise determinations could also be made of the cost of carrying out such
a strategy based on the expenses associated with relocation, and with the establishment of

new communities at the point of destination. Analysis could be done of the impact that
Black social and economic institutions could have in support of such a strategy, and on
how it would effect these institutions within the target state.

Because this idea has not been popularly discussed in American society, there is
no way to evaluate the general impression which people will have of this strategy within
the context of the possibility of success described here. Most of the people with whom I
discussed this potential strategy were surprised to find that the number of Black citizens
who would need to relocate to establish a majority in certain states was far lower than
they would initially have assumed. The possibility, slight as it may be, that a majorityBlack state could eventually develop as an unintended consequence of current population
trends is equally intriguing. If this idea were to find an outlet by which it could be
popularly discussed-and if the logistical possibilities were to be made generally
known-then further research could be conducted in the assessment of this strategy by
informed Black and White respondents.
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APPENDIX A
Black Any and Black Only proportions by state,
ranked from highest to lowest Black Any proportion

State or District

Black Any
Rank Percent

Black Only
Rank Percent

District of Columbia
Mississippi
Louisiana
South Carolina
Georgia
Maryland
Alabama
North Carolina

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

61.262
36.620
32.856
29.933
29.236
28.793
26.287
22.068

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

60.013
36.342
32.489
29.542
28.700
27.894
25.993
21.586

Virginia

9

20.360

9

19.641

Delaware
New York
Tennessee
Arkansas
Illinois
Florida
Michigan
New Jersey

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

20.055
17.043
16.757
15.978
15.602
15.465
14.837
14.401

10
12
11
13
14
15
16
17

19.227
15.885
16.396
15.671
15.112
14.613
14.215
13.570

Ohio
Texas

18
19

12.089
11.956

19
18

11.462
11.532

Missouri
Pennsylvania
Connecticut

20
21
22

11.713
10.497
9.957

20
21
22

11.249
9.972
9.098

Indiana

23

8.848

23

8.388

Oklahoma
Kentucky
Nevada

24
25
26

8.253
7.716
7.532

24
25
26

7.563
7.323
6.780

Source: U.S. Census
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APPENDIX A (cont.)

Black Any and Black Only proportions by state,
ranked from highest to lowest Black Any proportion

State or District

California
Kansas
Massachusetts
Wisconsin
Rhode Island
Colorado
Nebraska
Alaska
Minnesota
Washington
Arizona
West Virginia
Hawaii
Iowa

Black Any
Rank
Percent

Black Only
Rank
Percent

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

7.419
6.346
6.276
6.087
5.538
4.434
4.431
4.330
4.126
4.045
3.617
3.474
2.752
2.478

27
28
30
29
31
33
32
35
34
36
38
37
41
39

6.684
5.736
5.409
5.676
4.475
3.838
4.005
3.475
3.491
3.228
3.097
3.165
1.816
2.114

New Mexico

41

2.332

40

1.888

Oregon
Utah
New Hampshire
Wyoming
South Dakota
North Dakota
Maine
Vermont
Idaho
Montana

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

2.123
1.092
.989
.985
.886
.836
.749
.738
.628
.492

42
43
45
44
46
47
48
49
50
51

1.627
.791
.731
.754
.621
.610
.530
.503
.422
.298

Source: U.S. Census
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APPENDIX B
Black Any and Black Only populations by state,
ranked from highest to lowest Black Any population

State or District

Black Any
Rank
Population

Black Only
Rank
Population

New York
California
Texas
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
North Carolina
Maryland
Michigan
Louisiana
Virginia
Ohio
Pennsylvania
New Jersey

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

3,234,165
2,513,041
2,493,057
2,471,730
2,393,425
1,937,671
1,776,283
1,525,036
1,474,613
1,468,317
1,441,207
1,372,501
1,289,123
1,211,750

1
5
2
4
3
6
7
8
10
9
11
12
13
16

3,014,385
2,263,882
2,404,566
2,335,505
2,349,542
1,876,857
1,737,545
1,477,411
1,412,742
1,451,944
1,390,293
1,301,307
1,224,612
1,141,821

South Carolina
Alabama
Mississippi

15
16
17

1,200,901
1,168,998
1,041,708

14
15
17

1,185,216
1,155,930
1,033,809

Tennessee

18

953,349

18

932,809

Missouri

19

655,377

19

629,391

Indiana
Arkansas
Massachusetts

20
21
22

538,015
427,152
398,479

20
21
22

510,034
418,950
343,454

D.C.
Connecticut
Wisconsin
Kentucky

23
24
25
26

350,455
339,078
326,506
311,878

23
24
25
26

343,312
309,843
304,460
295,994

Source: U.S. Census

155

APPENDIX B (cont.)
Black Any and Black Only populations by state,
ranked from highest to lowest Black Any population

State or District

Black Any
Rank
Population

Black Only
Rank
Population

Oklahoma
Washington
Minnesota
Colorado
Arizona
Kansas
Delaware
Nevada
Nebraska
Oregon
Iowa
West Virginia

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

284,766
238,398
202,972
190,717
185,599
170,610
157,152
150,508
75,833
72,647
72,512
62,817

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
38
36
37

260,968
190,267
171,731
165,063
158,873
154,198
150,666
135,477
68,541
55,662
61,853
57,232

Rhode Island
New Mexico
Hawaii

39
40
41

58,051
42,412
33,343

39
40
41

46,908
34,343
22,003

Alaska
Utah
New Hampshire
Maine
Idaho

42
43
44
45
46

27,147
24,382
12,218
9,553
8,127

42
43
44
45
46

21,787
17,657
9,035
6,760
5,456

South Dakota
North Dakota
Wyoming

47
48
49

6,687
5,372
4,863

47
48
49

4,685
3,916
3,722

Vermont
Montana

50
51

4,492
4,441

50
51

3,063
2,692

Source: U.S. Census
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APPENDIX C
Number of Black immigrants necessary
to achieve a voting majority, accounting for

Black Any, Black Only, Over 18, and Eligible Voters

STATE
Delaware
Wyoming
Alaska
Vermont
North Dakota
South Dakota
Mississippi
Montana
Rhode Island
Hawaii
New Hampshire
Maine
Idaho

Black Any
469,296
484,056
572,638
599,843
631,456
741,470
761,242
893,313
932,217
1,144,851
1,211,350
1,255,817
1,277,699

Black Only
482,268
486,338
583,358
602,701
634,368
745,474
777,040
896,811
954,503
1,167,531
1,217,716
1,261,403
1,283,041

Over 18a
336,000
333,000
380,000
430,000
452,000
523,000
618,000
645,000
616,000
752,000
845,000
924,000
827,000

Eligible
332,900
319,700
376,100
434,000
455,300
521,100
635,800
642,900
607,700
749,200
843,100
924,000
823,400

Louisiana
Nebraska
South Carolina
West Virginia

1,532,342
1,559,597
1,610,210
1,682,710

1,565,088
1,574,181
1,641,580
1,693,880

1,129,000
1,093,000
1,311,000
1,355,000

1,141,400
1,085,300
1,314,900
1,350,100

Nevada
New Mexico

1,697,241
1,734,222

1,727,303
1,750,360

992,000
1,140,000

983,200
1,098,500

Arkansas
Alabama

1,819,096
2,109,104

1,835,500
2,135,240

1,199,000
2,109,104

1,193,000
1,516,900

Utah

2,184,405

2,197,855

1,325,000

1,325,000

Maryland
Kansas
Connecticut
Iowa

2,246,414
2,347,198
2,727,409
2,781,300

2,341,664
2,380,022
2,785,879
2,802,618

1,803,000
1,617,000
1,969,000
2,021,000

1,803,100
1,614,800
1,954,200
1,988,300

a: does not account for Black Only/Black Any
b: excludes persons disenfranchised as a result of a felony conviction
Source: U.S. Census; The Sentencing Project
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APPENDIX C (cont.)
Number of Black immigrants necessary
to achieve a voting majority, accounting for

Black Any, Black Only, Over 18, and Eligible Voters

STATE
Oklahoma
Oregon
Georgia
Kentucky
Tennessee
Colorado
Virginia
Missouri
North Carolina
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Arizona

Black Any
2,881,122
3,276,105
3,399,603
3,418,013
3,782,585
3,919,827
4,196,101
4,284,457
4,496,747
4,513,535
4,710,663
4,759,434

Black Only
2,928,718
2,228,000
3,487,369
2,575,000
2,780,000
2,569,000
2,766,000
3,209,000
2,846,000
3,250,000
3,373,000
2,735,000

Over 18a
1,964,000
2,228,000
1,993,000
2,575,000
2,780,000
2,569,000
2,766,000
3,209,000
2,846,000
3,250,000
3,373,000
2,735,000

Eligible b
1,946,400
2,222,500
1,991,000
2,565,000
2,758,800
2,560,300
2,716,200
3,190,400
2,843,100
3,208,400
3,354,300
2,673,600

Indiana
Washington
Massachusetts
New Jersey

5,004,455
5,417,325
5,552,139
5,990,850

3,692,000
3,733,000
3,898,000
3,861,000

3,692,000
3,733,000
3,898,000
3,861,000

3,688,800
3,614,900
3,898,000
3,853,100

Michigan
Illinois
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Florida

6,989,218
8,543,951
8,608,138
9,702,808
11,038,918

7,112,960
8,665,579
8,750,526
7,184,000
11,311,368

5,071,000
5,687,000
6,515,000
7,184,000
7,677,000

5,074,100
5,696,300
6,516,400
7,187,300
7,439,100

New York
Texas
California

12,508,127
15,865,706
28,845,566

12,947,687
16,042,688
29,343,884

8,215,000
9,410,000
16,006,000

8,213,600
9,113,200
15,903,600

a: does not account for Black Only/Black Any
b: excludes persons disenfranchised as a result of a felony conviction
Source: U.S. Census; The Sentencing Project
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